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AND EMOTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARBITRATION
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Hila Keren*
Abstract
The “arbitration revolution” has diminished access to justice for
millions of people, allowing American corporations to secure significant
insulation from collective challenges in both judicial and arbitral forums.
Although currently identified damages are immense, some scholars have
recently described proposals to undo the revolution as wishful thinking
in the current political climate. This Article acknowledges the political
difficulty but seeks to uncover the roots of the problem to re-open a path
for a change.
Offering an analysis of the 2019 United States Supreme Court
decision in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, this Article demonstrates that the
“revolution” has been driven not by the oft-declared policy of “favoring
arbitration,” but by a premeditated effort to undermine collectivity. This
legal hostility towards collective actions, this Article shows, has been
part of a broader transformation: the rise to dominance of neoliberalism
and the resulting creation of a corporatized political economy. It thus
reconceptualizes the arbitration revolution as a process of separating
collective actors, one that has been inspired by neoliberal theorists,
executed and funded by organized corporate interests, and embraced by
the Supreme Court.
This new framing highlights previously unrecognized harm of the
arbitration revolution: it leaves prospective claimants feeling isolated
from their peers and abandoned by their state, inducing pervasive
feelings of powerlessness. Having identified this affective outcome, this
Article shows how the emotional consequences of the revolution further
operate to suppress resistance and invoke resignation. These behavioral
tendencies are not unintended consequences; instead, they are produced
by a calculated effort to foster neoliberal hegemony and corporate control
by cultivating the passivity of ordinary citizens.
This Article ends with a warning that those who feel powerless and
resigned about the protection of their legal rights may feel similarly
indisposed to engage in other forms of democratic citizenship. By
offering a novel understanding of how the arbitration revolution vitiates
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collectivity and threatens democracy, this Article aims to reignite efforts
to undo the revolution and reauthorize citizens to act collectively.
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INTRODUCTION
The following is a true story that in April 2019 ended up in an
important Supreme Court decision.1
Early in 2016, while working as a warehouseman in Redlands,
California, Frank Varela discovered that his most personal information,
including his social security number, his tax identification number, and
his bank account number, was compromised by his employer.2 A letter
from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) confirmed that the sensitive data
was used to file a fraudulent tax return under Frank’s name.3 Frank had
to submit to the IRS an identity theft affidavit, and he and his wife,
1. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
2. Class Action Complaint at 4–5, Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., No. CV 16-577-DMG
(KSx), 2016 WL 9110161 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016), rev’d, 771 F. App’x 418 (9th Cir. 2019).
3. Id.
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Darlene, were notified by the IRS that the scam would prevent them from
using electronic filing for the foreseeable future.4 Distressed and afraid
of additional abuses, the couple also had to start paying monthly fees for
a lifetime monitoring of their accounts.5
Frank was not the only one to suffer.6 His employer of about nine
years, Lamps Plus, Inc.—“the nation’s largest lighting retailer”—
publicly announced that all those who had worked for Lamps Plus during
the 2015 calendar year were impacted.7 The company later explained that
a severe data breach occurred when it “fell victim to a sophisticated
criminal phishing attack” in which “[t]he hackers impersonated a highlevel Lamps Plus employee by sending a fake email to an actual Lamps
Plus employee and requested all of Lamps Plus’s 2015 W-2 employee tax
forms.”8 In response, “[t]he actual Lamps Plus employee . . . sent the W2s to the hackers.”9 At least 1,300 employees were harmed.10 As
compensation, Lamps Plus offered them one year of free identity
monitoring services.11
Frustrated by his employer’s continuous mishandling of the entire
scandal—from the initial neglect that enabled the harm, through the
failure to notify its victims, to the refusal to offer fair compensation—
Frank sued.12 On behalf of himself and the other affected employees, he
filed a class action complaint in a California federal district court and
sought relief.13 Lamps Plus, however, asked the trial court to compel
Frank to arbitrate the dispute and dismiss the lawsuit.14 The district court
found no way around the fact that, as a condition to being hired by Lamps
Plus, Frank had had to sign an arbitration agreement in 2007.15 For that
reason, the court decided to compel arbitration and accordingly dismissed
the case.16 However, the court allowed Frank to arbitrate all his claims,
including the class-wide claims he had made on behalf of all harmed
employees.17 Then, despite its success in compelling arbitration, Lamps
4. Id. at 5.
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 3–4.
8. Motion to Compel Arbitration on an Individual Basis &, in the Alternative, a Rule
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss at 1, Lamps Plus, No. CV 16-577-DMG (KSx), 2016 WL 9110161.
9. Id.
10. Class Action Complaint, supra note 2, at 3.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 3.
13. Id.
14. See Motion to Compel Arbitration on an Individual Basis &, in the Alternative, A Rule
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, supra note 8, at 2.
15. Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., No. CV 16-577-DMG (KSx), 2016 WL 9110161, at *1, *4
(C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016), rev’d, 771 F. App’x 418 (9th Cir. 2019).
16. Id. at *7.
17. Id.
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Plus appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, seeking
to prevent him from pursuing class arbitration and compel him to arbitrate
all by himself.18 The Ninth Circuit refused to order so,19 and Lamps Plus
continued its battle against class arbitration at the Supreme Court. In
April 2019, in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (Lamps Plus),20 the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, denying Frank the ability to
band together with his coworkers to hold their employer accountable for
the data breach that will continue to haunt them for many years.21
Lamps Plus is the Supreme Court’s latest opinion in a series of
decisions that, in the last few decades, and with particular intensity since
2010, continuously and considerably extended the reach of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).22 While the first cases in this series might have
appeared to reflect merely a procedural development, the ongoing
expansion of the FAA has later created a growing awareness that the
process has had an immense impact on matters of substantive law and
issues of socio-economic justice.
In response, scholars, journalists, and policymakers have made a
significant effort to document and analyze the increasing expansion of
the FAA. They frequently criticize the Court for extending the FAA far
beyond what its history and language could justify, and particularly for
allowing powerful corporations to include pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses in their standard contracts and to use them against
considerably weaker parties.23 By 2015, even before the process reached
its current peak, a federal judge described the constant expansion of the
FAA as one of the “most profound shifts in our legal history.”24 In a
similar tone, some scholars have referred to it as “the arbitration
revolution,”25 a designation that will be used here as well.
18. See Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 F. App’x 670 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 139 S. Ct.
1407.
19. Id. at 673.
20. 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
21. Id. at 1419.
22. Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1−16 (2012)).
23. See, e.g., David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An
Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 67, 75 (2015).
24. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015) (citing Federal Judge William G. Young),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-thedeck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/U848-RDP7].
25. E.g., Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law,
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 408–09 (discussing the effects of “the arbitration revolution”); see
Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 23, at 70–76 (2015) (explaining the development of “the
consumer arbitration revolution”); see also J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion
of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3057 (2015) (describing the Supreme Court’s recent
arbitration jurisprudence as its “arbitration revolution”).
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The arbitration revolution is far-reaching. The Supreme Court has
ruled that the FAA’s relentless protection of arbitration clauses applies in
a broad range of settings and therefore covers millions of people in a
multitude of situations.26 As legal scholar Judith Resnik described it in
2015, the FAA applies, for example,
when individuals claim breaches of federal securities laws;
when employees allege discrimination on the basis of age;
when employees file sex discrimination suits under state
law; when consumers assert rights under state consumer
protection laws; when merchants allege violations of the
antitrust laws; and when family members claim that
negligent management of nursing homes resulted in the
wrongful deaths of their relatives.27
Assuming you own a smartphone, have a bank account, and use a credit
card, the revolution applies to you and anyone you know.
As will be shown below, although the revolution is tied to arbitration
clauses inserted into standard contracts, it has less to do with arbitrating
disputes and much more to do with thwarting legal challenges altogether.
The revolution is an intentional and organized effort to prevent
individuals like Frank Varela from coping with corporate wrongdoing by
appealing to the powers of solidarity and collective action. What
appeared at first as merely an effort to avoid litigation in courts through
the imposition of mandatory arbitration has become a leading strategy of
corporations, later approved by the Court, to wield arbitration clauses as
weapons against any collective proceedings. Therefore, these clauses
impede collective acts regardless of forum, both in courts (class actions)
and in arbitration (class arbitrations). As the dissent in Lamps Plus
recently summed it up: “[T]he Court has hobbled the capacity of
employees and consumers to band together in a judicial or arbitral
forum.”28
The assault on all forms of collective actions—including when it
means denying claimants their “effective access to justice”29—is the most
disturbing part of the arbitration revolution. Such denial is particularly
alarming when, as the dissent in Lamps Plus emphasized, the dispute
“cries out for collective treatment” because it concerns corporate

26. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2839 (2015).
27. Id. (footnotes omitted).
28. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1421 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
29. Id. at 1422 (quoting DirecTV, Inc. v. Inburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting)).
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misconduct that identically and severely harmed numerous people.30
Without the ability to act together, victims of such misconduct cannot
seek redress due to their limited means and the prohibitive cost of legal
proceedings. Moreover, if no victim can effectively seek redress,
corporations gain immunity and have no incentive to avoid future
misconduct. Allowing this anti-collective mechanism to work in the first
place, and then gradually removing any remaining ability of lower courts
to limit it, is what makes the Court’s radical expansion of the FAA truly
“revolutionary.” This Article thus further studies unexplored dimensions
of this assault on collectivity.
Critics of the arbitration revolution have already described many of
its negative consequences. Currently identified harms include decreased
access to justice, hindered development of substantive laws, underenforcement of central federal laws that rely on private civil litigation,
and, due to the accumulation of all of the previous concerns, a severe
threat to equality and the rule of law.31 Additionally, a new wave of
studies has emerged, responding to the arbitration revolution in a
different way. These works seem to accept the revolution as a fait
accompli and thus refrain from seeking to roll it back. Instead, they focus
on describing and analyzing post-revolution realities, mostly drawing on
empirical tools.32 Pessimistically, some of these works have recently
described proposals to undo the revolution as wishful thinking in “the
current political climate.”33 But, even in the face of such a climate, it may
be too early to lose all hope for a change. This Article seeks to forge a
new path to reform by highlighting that the rich literature to date has paid
little to no attention to several key questions related to the anti-collective
heart of the arbitration revolution: What political powers facilitated the
legal foreclosure of all paths to collective actions?34 What are the long30. Id. at 1421.
31. See infra Part III.
32. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 23, at 70–76; see also Victor D. Quintanilla
& Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Predispute Binding Arbitration Clauses Are Unjust:
Ethical Implications for Dispute-System Design in the Time of Vanishing Trials, 85 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2119, 2121–22 (2017) (describing “[r]ecent empirical legal studies that explore predispute
binding arbitration”); Elizabeth C. Tippett & Bridget Schaaff, How Concepcion and Italian Colors
Affected Terms of Service Contracts in the Gig Economy, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 459, 464–75
(2018).
33. Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from Four
Providers, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 62 n.283 (2019) (stating that “federal intervention is wishful
thinking given the . . . current political climate”).
34. This question has received “little” attention while the following two received none.
More works have discussed relating to the first question. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE
DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 153 (2015) (“Together, these decisions assault
every level of organized popular power and collective consciousness in the United States: citizens,
consumers, workers.”); see also Gilles, supra note 25, at 409–14 (“[L]aw cannot grow in the
darkness with which arbitration shrouds its activities . . . .”).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss3/3

6

Keren: Divided and Conquered: The Neoliberal Roots and Emotional Consequ

2020]

THE NEOLIBERAL ROOTS AND EMOTIONAL CONSEQUENCES

581

term emotional and social consequences of such a dramatic shift? Finally,
which future reality may develop from these newly recognized
consequences?
This Article delves into these questions. The nuanced answers it
provides create new grounds for evaluating the arbitration revolution and
for resuming efforts to overturn it. Adding a multidisciplinary account of
the attack on collectivity to the current literature, this Article
reconceptualizes the meaning of the revolution and the magnitude of its
consequences while making three different claims.
The first is that the revolution has not been driven by the oftendeclared “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,”35 but by a
premeditated anti-collective approach instead. To substantiate this claim,
this Article analyzes the latest decision in Lamps Plus as offering
compelling new evidence that the revolution has been motivated by a
deep aversion to collectivity and has substantially contributed to a process
aimed at isolating people. Before Lamps Plus, many had seen the
revolution as anchored in the Court’s uncompromising command to
enforce class-action waivers.36 However, the analysis of Lamps Plus
offered here reveals that such waivers are effectively no longer necessary.
For the first time in the history of federal arbitration law, the Court has
clarified that even an arbitration clause without a waiver would suffice to
block collective actions.37 In other words, Lamps Plus has turned
mandatory isolation into the new default rule. Therefore, silence itself
becomes a waiver of the right to come together. And, since it is unrealistic
to think that corporations will draft their standard arbitration clauses in a
manner that expresses their affirmative consent to collective proceedings,
such a default rule essentially turns into a general ban on collective
proceedings.
This Article’s next claim is that the arbitration revolution is not
merely, and perhaps not even primarily, a legal shift. Rather, the anticollective approach and the isolation it imposes are essential features of
a greater transformative change: the rise to dominance of neoliberalism
and the resulting creation of a corporatized political economy. To
establish this claim, this Article first defines neoliberalism. It then traces
the interactions between the people, theories, and institutions that have
long been at the frontier of disseminating neoliberal logic, on the one
hand, and the revolution’s leading Supreme Court Justices and the
neoliberal legal discourse that they have advanced, on the other.
Recognizing what links, for example, a Nobel Laureate (James
Buchanan), an influential billionaire (Charles Koch), and a dominant
35. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
36. See, e.g., Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 23, at 65.
37. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019).
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Justice (Antonin Scalia) makes it possible to reconceptualize the
arbitration revolution as both a product of neoliberal rationality and a tool
for further establishing neoliberal hegemony. As such, the revolution
belongs with a growing list of legal shifts that follow the same trajectory,
allowing corporations not only to immunize themselves through contracts
but also to dominate campaign finance,38 hold First Amendment rights,39
break up unions,40 and so much more.
The third claim is that the arbitration revolution causes severe harm
that until now has not been identified: the inducement of long-lasting
feelings of powerlessness. This damage surfaces once one recognizes that
the arbitration revolution is part of an effective campaign designed to
separate people in order to make it harder for them to battle unlimited
corporate power. Drawing on a variety of reported qualitative interviews,
consumers’ websites, and studies of emotions, this Article uncovers how
the isolation created by the revolution extends its harsh practical effects
to the domain of emotions. It also describes the resulting perilous cluster
of emotions under, labels it “affective powerlessness,” and explains how
it works to leave people resigned and unable to resist. Critically, this
Article establishes that the resignation generated by affective
powerlessness is not an unintended consequence. Instead, it is part of
what anthropologists have called “the politics of resignation”—a
calculated effort to protect neoliberal hegemony and corporate control by
cultivating submissiveness.
When combined, the above three claims tell an unusual story, laying
the foundation for a new understanding of the arbitration revolution and
its sweeping results. It is a story of a separation process inspired by
neoliberal theorists, executed and funded by organized corporate
interests, and embraced by the Supreme Court. This separation process
leaves people isolated from their peers and abandoned by the state,
resulting in intense feelings of powerlessness. Unsurprisingly, as this
Article further explains, this emotional state operates to suppress
resistance and invoke resignation, both of which happen to serve the
neoliberal goal of full dominance perfectly. The most significant risk that
the revolution presents, therefore, does not arise merely from the fact that
corporations found a way—legitimized by the Supreme Court—to avoid
legal liability. The threat extends to the production of collective
numbness and dangerous apathy, which the law allows and perpetuates.
38. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010).
39. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 740 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“[The] RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation’s religious beliefs
no matter the impact that accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the
corporation owners’ religious faith . . . .”).
40. See Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018) (invalidating a statute that required
all employees, including nonmembers, to pay a membership fee).
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This Article tells this meaningful story in three Parts. The first Part
reanalyzes the leading cases of the arbitration revolution in light of the
latest decision in Lamps Plus, demonstrating that the revolution has
worked to suppress collective actions and has embraced corporations’
efforts to avoid liability by separating masses of claimants. The second
Part places the separating effect of the arbitration revolution within a web
of neoliberal powers, explaining how the legal shift has both reflected the
rise of neoliberalism and actively enhanced its dominance. The third Part
builds on the previous two to expose a troubling and unrecognized effect
of the separation process: the generation of affective powerlessness. It
further illuminates how feelings of powerlessness tend to repress
resistance and foster resignation.
This Article concludes with a warning that adds urgency to its call for
undoing the separating power of the arbitration revolution. The isolation
and resignation intentionally engendered by neoliberals and the
corporations they promote are unlikely to remain contained within the
boundaries of standard contracts. People who feel resigned regarding
their legal rights are prone to feel similarly indisposed to engage in other
forms of democratic citizenship. This Article thus offers a better
understanding of how the arbitration revolution threatens democracy.
Such recognition should reignite efforts to give people back their freedom
to act collectively and, with it, the drive to contribute to our democratic
society.
I. SUPPRESSING COLLECTIVE ACTIONS
More than resulting from a “liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration,”41 the arbitration revolution has been driven by a
premeditated anti-collective approach. This Part provides compelling
new evidence that the revolution has been motivated by a deep aversion
to collectivity, clearly aiming at isolating people. Until recently, many
had seen the revolution as anchored in the Court’s uncompromising
command to enforce class-action waivers.42 However, the analysis of
latest case of the revolution, Lamps Plus, against the background of its
predecessors, reveals that such waivers are effectively no longer
necessary. For the first time in the history of federal arbitration law, the
Court has clarified that even a “silent” arbitration clause, one without a
waiver, would suffice to block collective actions.43 In other words, Lamps
Plus has turned isolation into the new default rule. Therefore, silence
itself becomes a waiver of the right to come together. And, since it is
41. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
42. See, e.g., Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 23, at 65.
43. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019).
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unrealistic to think that corporations will draft their standard arbitration
clauses in a manner that expressly permits collective proceedings, such a
default rule essentially means that any arbitration clause forbids class
action, even if it does not say so. What comes next explains how we got
to this point.
A. Arbitration Clauses as Hideouts
The use of contractual arbitration clauses to prevent collective actions
of small parties (individuals and small businesses) against their massive
counterparts (large-scale corporations) is a relatively new phenomenon.
For many years the practice of arbitration and the jurisprudence that
surrounded it did not relate to collective actions at all.44 As many have
repeatedly noted, the principal legislation pertaining to arbitration, the
FAA, was enacted in 1925 “to enable merchants of roughly equal
bargaining power to enter into binding agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes.”45 In 1925, and for many decades after the enactment
of the FAA, predispute arbitration agreements were in limited use, and to
the extent they existed, they did not attempt to prevent collective
actions.46
Put differently, while legal “friendliness” towards the practice of
arbitration dates back to the 1925 FAA, judicial hostility towards
collective actions—either in courts or in arbitration—is a more recent
shift. And it is a dramatic shift that has been facilitated by a combination
of technological, economic, political, and legal conditions. Importantly,
this shift has very little to do with arbitration as a method of settling
disputes outside of courts.47 Instead, the shift represents an immense
effort to avoid dispute resolution altogether. For that reason, describing
the process as the arbitration revolution, or referring to the Court’s recent
“arbitration jurisprudence,”48 tends to obscure the true nature of the
transformation. What is truly at stake is a legally facilitated practice that
is calculatedly designed to insulate corporations from legal liability by
preventing claimants from coming together—which is by and large their
only viable path to redress.
Given the intention to avoid liability by breaking up groups of
similarly harmed people, perhaps a more adequate name for the process
would have been “the isolation revolution” or “the separation revolution.”
44. See Gilles, supra note 25, at 390.
45. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1643 (2018).
46. Gilles, supra note 25, at 375, 376 (describing how, until the last two decades, use of
arbitration clauses to block class actions was unimaginable).
47. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of
the Modern Class Actions, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 396 (2005).
48. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 25, at 3054 (emphasis added) (repeatedly referring to the
Supreme Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence).
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Nonetheless, because the analysis that follows generally aims at
reconceptualizing the meaning of the arbitration revolution, it continues
to use this phrase to address the legal change while demonstrating that,
in reality, it establishes an intentional separation process with harsh
consequences.
The argument on this point is more than rhetorical. First, and most
significantly, including separating terms within arbitration clauses or
arbitration agreements artificially places these terms under the coverage
of the FAA. Such placement awards separating terms disproportionate
protection that initially only meant to promote conducting arbitrations
and not preventing them. Second, because arbitration generally enjoys a
positive reputation—much thanks to powerful messages from the
Supreme Court49—the method of folding isolating terms into arbitration
agreements operates to conceal the negative impact of these anticollective terms. Consequently, because the anti-collective terms are
hidden within arbitration agreements, noticing and resisting their
separating effect turns harder. The following section will describe how
the contractual use of arbitration clauses turned into an effort to suppress
collective action and how the Supreme Court’s constant support of such
manipulation has not only propelled its use but also enhanced its effect.
As we shall see, achieving isolation through arbitration has been a
product of a reciprocal exchange between corporations and an activist
pro-corporate judiciary.
B. Separation via Enforcement of Collective Action Waivers
Arbitration clauses did not always dictate isolation. The change has
started during the 1990s and was driven by a growing desire of
corporations to limit or even avoid their exposure to class actions.50 Many
corporations that at earlier times did not seem interested in any form of
alternative dispute resolution, or even opposed it,51 have begun to
reconsider their approach. Of particular significance at this time was the
technological progress that had increased the use of paper standard-form
contracts and would later speed up even more with the ability to use
online mass-contracting. This progress allowed corporations to dictate
the content of their contracts with greater ease and an immensely
enhanced impact. Encouraged by professional publications that
recommended a pro-active solution to the “problem” of class actions,
49. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration.”).
50. Gilles, supra note 47, at 396.
51. See SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT 55 (2015) (describing how in the past corporations resisted arbitration,
especially in the employment domain).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 3 [], Art. 3

586

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

corporations and their lawyers have launched the attack on collective
actions: drafting and including in all their contracts what today seems to
be an integral part of almost any standard-form contract: collective action
waivers.52 As their name suggests, these waivers’ goal is to make
individuals and small businesses give up their ability to respond to
corporate wrongdoing by joining forces with similarly harmed others.53
Aware of the general favoring of arbitrations, experts suggested to
place the new collective action waivers not just anywhere in the contract
but deliberately insert them into arbitration clauses.54 At the time, predispute arbitration clauses offered “safe harbors” for the new waivers
since courts had already shown an increased inclination to treat
arbitration clauses favorably, even when they were tucked in the
boilerplate of standard form contracts.55 In an article tellingly titled “The
Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield,” for example, the author wrote
that “[while a]n arbitration clause may not be an invincible shield against
class action litigation . . . it is surely one of the strongest pieces of armor
available . . . .”56
The creative proposal to separate potential joint claimants via standard
contracts that include arbitration clauses in their boilerplate had an
impact. By the late 1990s, a growing number of corporations had adopted
collective action waivers as part of their newly implemented or formerly
existing arbitration clauses.57 And yet, about a decade later, in 2005,
Professor Myriam Gilles reported that “[t]he penetration of
collective action waivers is relatively miniscule today,” importantly
attributing the slowness of the process to the then-existing uncertainty
regarding the legal validity of mass-use of collective action waivers.58
Indeed, as Professor Gilles predicted,59 the speedy spread of the new anticollective strategy was awaiting an endorsement from the legal system.
Some of the hesitations of corporations and their lawyers were
generated by the then-unanswered question: What if a court will strike
52. Gilles, supra note 47, at 396–98. This Article follows Professor Gilles’s choice to use
the term “collective action waivers” to capture a variety of possible aggregate proceedings
available either in courts or in arbitration. Id. at 376 n.15.
53. See id. at 396.
54. See id. at 396–97.
55. See id. at 393–94.
56. Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE
L. J. 141, 142 (1997).
57. Gilles, supra note 47, at 397–98.
58. Id. at 425; see id. at 426 (suggesting that the lack of appellate opinions regarding
collective action waivers might cause “reluctance on the part of general counsel to rush into a
perceived violation of applicable law”).
59. Id. at 426 (“I do expect a tipping point, where it becomes perfectly clear to the broader
business community that their interests demand the full-scale imposition of collective action
waivers . . . . Most likely, this watershed moment will be precipitated by a major court
decision . . . .”).
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down the collective action waiver while enforcing the remainder of the
agreement to arbitrate? Indeed, some courts did just that, managing to
simultaneously offer protection of collective rights and convey respect to
arbitration.60 They accomplished that by invalidating the collective action
waiver while compelling arbitration that allowed collectivity through
class arbitration.61 Revealingly, when corporations realized that they
might find themselves exposed to mass battles outside of court and
without the protections that the public legal system offers to defendants,
many of them lost interest in committing to arbitration,62 demonstrating
that this alternative dispute resolution method was not really what they
were looking for when they added to their contracts “arbitration”
clauses.63 Such corporate response offers historical support to the current
argument that, in many cases, arbitration clauses were merely a tool to
achieve an anti-collective goal.
A recent empirical study further bolsters this point. It describes the
practice that corporations developed to include a non-severability
provision in their arbitration clauses.64 Such a provision clarifies that in
case of invalidation of the desirable component—the collective action
waiver—the entire agreement to arbitrate should not be enforced.65 In
other words, in their contractual relationships with those with less
bargaining power, corporations have demonstrated much more interest in
avoiding the need to deal with collectives than an investment in
arbitration.66 Or, as Professor Gilles phrased it back in 2005: “[B]efore
the collective action waiver issue arose, arbitration did not matter
all that much.”67
And then came the “tectonic shift”68: The one legal decision that more
than ever before embraced and actively advanced the project of
separating claimants, leaving them too isolated to pursue their rights. In
the now-famous 2011 Supreme Court decision of AT&T Mobility LLC v.
60. See, e.g., Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding
a class action waiver “violate[d] fundamental notions of fairness”).
61. E.g., id. at 1101–02.
62. Gilles, supra note 47, at 410.
63. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to Rebuild the Labor
Movement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1682, 1691 (2014) (“Arbitration is not a panacea for employers.”).
64. See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 BYU L.
REV. 1, 40.
65. See Tippett & Schaaff, supra note 32, at 493–95; see also Rutledge & Drahozal, supra
note 64, at 40 (reporting in the context of credit cards that “[s]lightly under half of the
clauses . . . from issuers with slightly more than half the market share . . . contained an ‘antiseverability provision’”).
66. Tippett & Schaaff, supra note 32, at 493 (arguing that the inclusion of a severability
provision “suggests that the company is using the arbitration clause primarily or exclusively for
the class action waiver”).
67. Gilles, supra note 47, at 427.
68. Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 33, at 4.
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Concepcion (Concepcion),69 the Court removed most of the uncertainty
that had previously made corporations hesitate regarding the strategy of
adding arbitration clauses to their contracts in order to bury within them
collective action waivers. In this 5–4 decision, the Court dramatically
expanded the coverage of the FAA and reinterpreted it as powerful
enough to prevent lower courts from invalidating collective action
waivers.70 In doing so, the Court took away the judicial power of lower
courts to protect collectivity, siding with corporations’ interest to avoid
liability by using the method of “divide and conquer.”
It is invaluable to recognize that Concepcion was not purely a legal
development by an activist judiciary, but rather a product of an intentional
joint effort of some of the leading corporations in America. The goal was
to devastate collective actions by devising a new weapon against them.
According to the findings of a New York Times special investigation, in
July 1999, a consortium of legal teams of leading corporations began a
series of meetings to strategize about how “to kill class actions.”71 Among
the participants in the meetings were representatives of powerful
corporations such as American Express,72 which will later star in one of
the revolution’s cases. Legal teams from leading banks such as Bank of
America, Chase, Citigroup, and powerful corporations such as Sears,
Toyota, and General Electric were present at the meeting as well.73
Interestingly, at the time of the first meeting, American Express had
already invented and implemented the practice of avoiding collective
actions.74 Its standard contract stated that the company “may elect to
resolve any claim by individual arbitration.”75
Significant to the inception of the revolution at the Supreme Court,
also in attendance were representatives of Discover Bank, 76 the
corporation that a few years later would be responsible for the birth and
brief life of the “Discover Bank Rule.”77 Although at the time of the first
meeting of the consortium Discover Bank did not yet include class action
waivers in its standard contracts, it adopted them within several months,
possibly influenced by American Express and other consortium members

69. 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
70. See id. at 351–52 (holding that the FAA preempts state law).
71. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 24.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Am. Express).
76. Id.
77. This rule worked for a while to justify invalidation of collective action waiver when
their practical meaning was denial of redress, but was later rejected in Concepcion. See AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340, 352 (2011).
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that had previously used the practice.78 But then, in 2002, when Discover
Bank was sued for a wrongful charge of fees and tried to avoid liability
by preventing class action based on the above waivers, California’s
Fourth District Court of Appeal refused to enforce them.79 It reasoned
that the waivers were akin to a “license to push the boundaries of good
business practices to their furthest limits.”80 Discover Bank did not give
up and petitioned the Supreme Court seeking intervention.81 Remarkably,
at this point the company was represented by then-lawyer John Roberts,
who would later become the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, taking
an active part in forever changing the status of collective action waivers.82
In any case, in 2002, while still a prominent defense attorney, and armed
with advice from the organizer of the strategic consortium,83 he wrote that
invalidating collective action waivers “contravenes the central purpose of
the Arbitration Act: enforcing arbitration agreements according to their
terms.”84
Although the Court denied the petition, these words—and the idea that
state courts must enforce collective action waivers—became the law of
the land nine years later in Concepcion, when the man who had penned
them was already at the other side of the bench. Perfectly echoing Chief
Justice Roberts older petition, Justice Scalia decided for the first time that
state courts can no longer do to corporations what they did in 2002 to
Discover Bank, because “[t]he ‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to
‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to
their terms.’”85 The organized effort of the 1999 corporate consortium
had finally succeeded.
After Concepcion, several other Supreme Court decisions followed,
removing any remaining uncertainties regarding the scope of Concepcion
and the power of class action waivers to separate people. First in the series
was American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant (“Italian Colors”).86
It removed the argument that even after Concepcion, collective action
waivers may be invalidated if they patently leave no way for claimants to
vindicate their statutory rights.87 Corporations were now expressly
78. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 24 (“Of the companies participating, only
American Express and First USA had adopted an arbitration clause banning class actions; months
later, Discover Bank added its own.”).
79. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
80. Id.
81. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 24.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3–4, Discover Szetela, 537 U.S. 1226 (No. 02-829).
85. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (alteration in original)
(quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
86. 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
87. Id. at 236–37, 239.
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allowed to draft their contracts in a way that aims at escaping liability.
Symbolically, the direct beneficiary of the decision was American
Express—a member of the 1999 consortium that had tried for many years
to find a way to avoid liability by using the special protections awarded
to arbitration. And yet, for a while, and until 2018, there was still a reason
to believe that the judicial approval of collective action waivers against
consumers (Concepcion) and small businesses (Italian Colors) would not
be further extended to the employment setting. Although the Supreme
Court’s “tortured reading” of the FAA already “opened the floodgates for
enforcement of arbitration agreements imposed on employees as a
condition of employment,”88 there was nonetheless a lingering doubt
regarding employers’ ability to force their employees via the use of
waivers to give up class arbitration.89
In the case of employment, the new reading of the FAA seemed to
stand in direct conflict with another veteran federal act: the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Given the gap of power between
employers and employees, the legislature has explicitly expressed its care
for “the individual unorganized worker [who] is commonly helpless”90
and thus has sought to protect employees’ ability to band together.
Particularly, § 7 of the NLRA91 awards employees “the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”92 Indeed, a
year after Concepcion, the National Labor Relations Board decided that
collective action waivers that prevent class claims in both judicial and
arbitral forums violate the NLRA because their goal is to avoid a type of
concerted activity that the statute protects.93 To add to the confusion,
courts around the country responded in conflicting ways to the Board’s
position regarding the conflict between the FAA and the NLRA—some
rejecting it and others approving it.94 The question regarding the validity

88. Hodges, supra note 63, at 1685 (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S 105,
118–19 (2001)).
89. Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., No. CV 16-577-DMG (KSx), 2016 WL 9110161, at *7
(C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016) (stating that, given the support of collectivity under the NLRA, class
action waivers “in the employment context would likely not be enforceable”), rev’d, 771 F. App’x
418 (9th Cir. 2019).
90. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1635 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2012)).
91. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
93. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2280–81, 2286 (2012), granted in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).
94. Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 33, at 4 (describing, for example, the conflict
between the Second and Ninth Circuits).
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of collective action waivers in the employment setting was left up in the
air.
But then the revolution progressed to remove the doubt. In Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis (Epic),95 another 5–4 decision led by the
conservative majority of the Supreme Court, the placement of collective
action waivers within arbitration clauses led to prioritizing the FAA over
the NLRA, thereby further legitimizing the use of isolation methods
under the guise of enforcing arbitration clauses.96 Because the decision in
Epic is very recent and directly relates to the value of collective actions,
it is worth a closer look.
The litigation that ended in the 2018 Epic decision started before
Concepcion’s unconditional judicial embrace of collective action
waivers. Back at that time, the validity of such waivers was still
questionable. Employees of Ernst & Young, one of the largest accounting
firms in the world, sued their powerful employer after “the firm had
misclassified its junior accountants as professional employees,” thereby
depriving them of overtime pay.97 The employees sought to resist the
enforcement of the collective action waiver in their contracts and raised
the same difficulty that existed in Concepcion and American Express.98
They highlighted the fact that the separated claim of each of them was
too small to allow an expensive individual pursuit of rights.99 Notably,
this is an especially acute problem in the employment setting where
disputes frequently arise from relatively modest wage-and-hour claims of
underpaid employees.100 In the particular conflict between Ernst &
Young and its junior accountants, for example, the value of the
employees’ separate harms ranged between $2,000 and $29,000, but to
prove each one of them alone (despite their identical nature) would have
required an investment of about $200,000 per claimant. 101 For that
reason, the employees sought to unite efforts via a class action, whereas
Ernst & Young tried to block them by enforcing the waivers in their
contracts.
At this time, before Concepcion, one New York federal district court
considering the counterarguments of the parties concluded that
“[e]nforcement of the class waiver provision in this case would
effectively ban all proceedings by [the employee] against [Ernst &
95. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
96. Id. at 1642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1620 (majority opinion).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100. Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Epic Backslide: The Supreme Court
Endorses Mandatory Individual Arbitration Agreements—#TimesUp on Workers’ Rights, 15
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 43, 45 (2019).
101. Id. at 66.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 3 [], Art. 3

592

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

Young].”102 The same court further highlighted the injustice that would
have followed by explaining that while the employee “[would] be unable
to pursue her claims, even if they are meritorious,” Ernst & Young would
“enjoy de facto immunity from liability for alleged violations of the labor
laws.”103 In a strong demonstration of the influence of Concepcion and
American Express, a district court in California in 2013 facing the same
counterarguments in an identical dispute between Ernst & Young and its
underpaid accountants reached the opposite conclusion.104 Following
Concepcion, this court concluded that the inability to pursue rights
individually due to the prohibitive cost of separate proceedings could not
justify the invalidation of collective action waivers.105 Both the New
York case and the California case were appealed and both were reversed,
leaving the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit in conflict,106 thereby
opening the gate for another watershed Supreme Court decision.
Following the unprecedented expansion of the FAA in Concepcion
and American Express by the late Justice Scalia, his replacement, Justice
Gorsuch, decided in Epic that in the clash between two federal laws—the
FAA and NLRA—the former governs.107 The process of failing claimants
by separating them with collective action waivers that enjoy the FAA’s
protection had been completed. As a result, consumers, small businesses,
employees, and many others who were somehow subjected to such
waivers no longer have effective recourse in all the countless cases in
which the cost of separate proceedings is prohibitive. With the active help
of the Supreme Court, corporations had found a way to carefully plan a
world in which as long as they cause smaller harms to numerous victims,
no one will be able to hold them accountable. As the next section will
show, the real motivation to “divide and conquer” becomes even more
apparent when looking at the parallel process that has developed in cases
in which corporations did not add collective action waivers to their
contracts.
C. Separation via Interpretation of Silent Arbitration Clauses
Many jurists and scholars discuss the increased enforcement of class
action waivers and the intensified judicial prevention of class arbitration

102. Sutherland v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d,
726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013).
103. Id.
104. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No. C-12-04964 RMW, 2013 WL 3460052, at *3, *10
(N.D. Cal. July 9, 2013), rev’d, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
105. See id. at *4–7 (discussing whether arbitration is prohibitively expensive).
106. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 33, at 4.
107. Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1642.
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when no such waivers exist without differentiating the two situations.108
However, for the task taken up in this Article—to better trace the progress
of a separation process and its consequences—it is valuable to distinguish
the pair. Critical Supreme Court cases that have played an active role in
the development of isolation methods under the pretext of “favoring
arbitration”109 were not at all similar to Concepcion, American Express,
or Epic, as they did not focus on the enforcement of collective action
waivers. Instead, in the last decade, and confusingly during the same
period, a distinct line of cases arose. These cases contributed to the
separation effect of arbitration clauses by merely interpreting them as
blocking claimants from banding together even though they did not
include any express waiver of collective action. This Article will call this
line of cases the “interpretation cases” to distinguish them from the
“waiver cases” discussed in the previous section.
Unlike ever before, the last decade has brought about a growing
willingness of the Court to read “silent” arbitration clauses—devoid of a
waiver of aggregate proceedings—as if they explicitly included such a
waiver. The bellwether of the interpretation cases is Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. (Stolt-Nielsen)110—a Supreme Court case that
was decided on April 27, 2010, exactly a year before Concepcion.111 The
litigation arose after a group of shipping companies (collectively, StoltNielsen) was found by the Department of Justice to be involved in an
illegal price-fixing conspiracy.112 One harmed customer that had
overpaid for ocean transportation services, a company named
AnimalFeeds, filed a putative class action in court.113 However, because
the parties included an arbitration clause in their contract, the dispute was
eventually sent, with other similar cases, to arbitration.114
When AnimalFeeds filed a demand for class arbitration, Stolt-Nielsen
objected and insisted that AnimalFeeds alone should carry any
108. See, e.g., Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 33, at 5 n.26 (listing thirteen cases that
form the new arbitration jurisprudence without differentiating); see also Hodges, supra note 63,
at 1687–88 (lumping together Concepcion and Italian Colors, which discuss class action waivers,
with Stolt-Nielsen, discussed below, that had no waiver). But see David Horton, Clause
Construction: A Glimpse into Judicial and Arbitral Decision-Making, 68 DUKE L. J. 1323, 1325
(2019) (differentiating between “two major ways” of expanding the FAA). For an example of a
judicial recognition of the difference, see Oregel v. PacPizza, LLC, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436, 448
(Ct. App. 2015), where a California Court of Appeals recognized that “Concepcion [i]s irrelevant”
if an arbitration clause “d[oes] not contain a class action waiver.”
109. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346 (2011) (quoting Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)).
110. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
111. Id.
112. Horton, supra note 108, at 1349.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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arbitration.115 At this point, the parties agreed to submit this threshold
dispute to a panel of three arbitrators that unanimously decided that the
parties’ arbitration clause allowed the arbitration to proceed as a class
arbitration.116 The panel reasoned that since the arbitration clause was
silent against a background in which class arbitrations are a common
practice, the collective method could be used.117 However, when the case
arrived at the Supreme Court, Justice Alito was not convinced. He
concluded that the entire decision of the panel rested merely on the public
policy of favoring class arbitrations and as such amounted to a forbidden
exercise of the panel’s power.118
Had the Court stopped at awarding a loss to the party seeking a class
arbitration, Stolt-Nielsen would probably not have gained its high status
in the pantheon of the new arbitration jurisprudence. Indeed, for many
years after the publication of the decision, many courts took Stolt-Nielsen
to be limited by its relatively rare facts of sophisticated parties that
stipulated that both of them never gave even implied consent to aggregate
procedures.119 But what makes Stolt-Nielsen in retrospect so crucial to
the separation project discussed here is the fact that the Court did not stop
at settling the particular dispute. Instead, in an activist move, Justice Alito
insisted on using the case to introduce a new and hostile view of banding
together in arbitrations.
In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court started to develop the argument that “class
arbitration” is an oxymoron or an abnormality, suggesting an inherent
discrepancy between the idea of arbitration and collectivity. Without
citing to any supporting resources, Justice Alito stated that “class-action
arbitration changes the nature of arbitration” and added that the
differences between individual arbitration and class arbitration are just
“too great.”120 The idea that class is not a legitimate type of arbitration of
the kind protected by the FAA was not only unprecedented; it also
conflicted with the reality at the time of the decision. Ever since the
1980s, certainly during the 2000s, including in 2010, and indeed even in
the years after Stolt-Nielsen, class arbitrations have been in full use.121
Further, the leading arbitration providers not only have long offered class
arbitrations; they also have created and published elaborate rules
designed to institutionalize this way of dispute resolution.122 In fact, in
115. See id.
116. Id. at 1349–50.
117. Id. at 1350.
118. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 677 (2010).
119. See Horton, supra note 108, at 1351–53 (describing the confusion).
120. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685–87.
121. See Horton, supra note 108, at 1349 (presenting data released by the AAA); see also
Alyssa S. King, Too Much Power and Not Enough: Arbitrators Face the Class Dilemma, 21
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1031, 1037 (2017) (describing the history of class arbitration).
122. King, supra note 121, at 1039–40; see also Horton, supra note 108, at 1349.
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2003, the Court explicitly confirmed the authority of arbitrators to decide
the availability of class arbitration proceedings in situations in which the
arbitration clause lacked a collective action waiver.123 And, all these
years, neither arbitrators nor judges have expressed doubt regarding the
general fit between arbitrations and aggregate proceedings. The decision
in Stolt-Nielsen was in that respect “revolutionary.”
Exactly a year after Stolt-Nielsen, in Concepcion, the Court
enthusiastically adopted the new ostracizing of class arbitrations, this
time in the context of the waiver cases. The late Justice Scalia set the
tone, and his bluntness added an edge to Justice Alito’s innovation. The
unique rhetoric he used and what it reveals will be further explored in the
next Part. For now, however, the point is more descriptive: the process of
making class arbitrations seem inadequate started at Stolt-Nielsen and
was significantly amplified in Concepcion. Post-2011, many have
predicted that the two cases together “would effectively end the use of
class arbitration.”124 In reality, however, as the opening story of Frank
Varela demonstrates, class arbitrations remained both desirable and
available.
Then, in 2013, only ten days before the decision in Italian Colors,
which further fortified Concepcion in the line of the waiver cases, the
Court released a ruling in another interpretation case. The new
interpretation case—Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter125—was factually
similar to Stolt-Nielsen, but it did not feature any stipulation between the
parties regarding the silence of their agreement.126 This time, the Court
affirmed an arbitrator’s decision to interpret a broadly phrased arbitration
clause as reflecting consent to class arbitration.127 It was a rare 9–0
decision, and none of the Justices mentioned the argument that class
arbitration is not truly a form of arbitration.128 Perhaps encouraged by the
deference of the Court in Oxford Health Plans, arbitrators continued to
permit class arbitrations in cases of broadly phrased arbitration clauses.
However, a 2017 empirical study of sixty-four arbitral decisions that were
published after Stolt-Nielsen and before the end of 2015 shows the
immense impact of the Court’s new hostility to class arbitration,
documenting a sharp decline in arbitrators’ willingness to permit class
123. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447, 452–53 (2003).
124. King, supra note 121, at 1042 & n.72 (describing the response and citing articles to that
effect).
125. 569 U.S. 564 (2013).
126. See id. at 567.
127. Id. at 566, 573.
128. The only (quite subtle) hint in this direction was in Justice Alito’s concurrence, in which
he noted that, because in arbitration class members can enjoy a win but avoid a loss if they do not
opt in before a decision is made, the Court may need to reconsider whether “the availability of
class arbitration is a question the arbitrator should decide.” Id. at 575.
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arbitration.129 It took six more years for the crusade on class arbitrations
in the context of the interpretation cases to resume.130
And then, following the footsteps of the latest waiver case—the 2018
Epic decision—came the newest development in the interpretation cases:
the 2019 decision in Lamps Plus.131 As we have seen, in this decision, the
Court ordered that Frank Varela and some 1,300 employees of the
national company Lamps Plus could not band together to seek redress
from their employer for severely compromising their personal and
financial data.132 The 5–4 decision in Lamps Plus does to the strand of
interpretation cases what Epic has done to the line of waiver cases:
removing any remaining arguments that former cases were somehow
limited by their context and left some room for legitimate collective
action. The novelty of the decision in Lamps Plus and its unprecedented
demonstration of bias against collectivity call for a closer look.
The story of the dispute discussed in Lamps Plus opened this Article.
As Justice Ginsburg commented in her dissent, it is a story that “cries out
for collective treatment.”133 The harm to Frank Varela and his coworkers
originated from one identical incident: a single email that was sent by a
senior employee to a hacker and exposed the most private details of each
and every employee.134 The consequences of this event were dire and
similar for each employee: long-term exposure to abuse of the data by an
unlimited amount of its receivers.135 And, despite the magnitude of the
event, Lamps Plus offered all the victims the same unsuitable solution of
one year of free identity monitoring services.136 It is, therefore,
particularly hard to see what is “inefficient” in consolidating about 1,300
identical claims, all resulting from one data breach. On the contrary, it
seems illogical and wasteful to require each employee to pay a separate
lawyer and independently prove what happened. And yet, to a corporation
determined to avoid liability and to a Court resolved to eradicate class
arbitrations—none of this seemed to matter.
After two lower courts authorized class arbitration, the Court reversed
and insisted that Frank Varela and his numerous coworkers must seek
justice separately.137 This conclusion, Chief Justice Roberts explained,
129. King, supra note 121, at 1044 (describing a decline from a high permission rate at the
level of 90% (or about 70%) of the cases to a low permission rate of only 45%).
130. Ten days after Oxford Health Plans, Justice Scalia’s decision in American Express was
published. It included abundant citations from Concepcion and another fierce attack on class
arbitrations.
131. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
132. Id. at1419.
133. Id. at 1421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1412 (majority opinion).
135. See id. at 1413.
136. Class Action Complaint, supra note 2, at 4.
137. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1413, 1419.
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accepts as a starting point that the arbitration clause that Lamps Plus
included in its standard contracts was ambiguous.138 Such a starting point
should have set the case apart from Stolt-Nielsen, in which the parties did
not argue for two opposing interpretations. However, the glaring
difference did not strike Chief Justice Roberts as significant. To him,
while regular contractual ambiguity calls for interpretation that attempts
to “ascertain[]” one of the two competing meanings of the disputed
contractual language,139 ambiguity in the arbitration context should work
differently.140 In the case of arbitration clauses, explained Chief Justice
Roberts for the first time, courts are not free to approach the interpretation
task with their usual impartiality.141 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts
maintained that when considering whether an ambiguous arbitration
clause reflects an intention to allow or ban collective proceedings, “it is
important to recognize the ‘fundamental’ difference between class
arbitration and the individualized form of arbitration envisioned by the
FAA.”142
In other words, courts and arbitrators should start from a preference
to not allow class arbitrations because, since 2010, those had been marked
as not deserving the protection of the FAA. For that reason, writes Chief
Justice Roberts, “ambiguity does not provide a sufficient basis to
conclude that parties to an arbitration agreement agreed to ‘sacrifice[] the
principal advantage of arbitration.’”143 The innovative declaration that
ambiguity is not enough to open the way to class arbitration leaves no
escape from asking what might be enough. On this point, the Court has
reached a new peak in the separation process. For the first time in the
history of the FAA, it clarified that once an arbitration clause is included
in a contract the only way to allow class arbitration is “an affirmative
‘contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.’”144
Although Chief Justice Roberts has probably tried to conceal it,145 the
word “affirmative” in the sentence cited above is not part of any previous
138. Id. at 1414–15.
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“Interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof is the ascertainment of its meaning.”).
140. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1414–15.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1416 (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622–23 (2018)).
143. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333,
348 (2011)).
144. Id. (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010)).
145. See id. Chief Justice Roberts used the past tense of “we held” in the full sentence,
suggesting that the entire sentence is a product of previous holdings. Here is the full sentence
including the citation of Stolt-Nielsen: “And for that reason, we held that courts may not infer
consent to participate in class arbitration absent an affirmative ‘contractual basis for concluding
that the party agreed to do so.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684).
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decision of the Court. Significantly, this word is the newest layer of the
arbitration revolution. The rule coming from Stolt-Nielsen required “a
contractual basis for concluding that [a] party agreed [to class
arbitration].”146 Chief Justice Roberts repeated it, citing Stolt-Nielsen to
create an impression of continuation, but added before it—not once but
twice147—a single adjective that forms a significant shift. This stealth
modification of the Stolt-Nielsen rule turns a so-called ambiguous
arbitration clause—one that is phrased very broadly without banning
class arbitration—into a clear one. From now on, we are told, any
phrasing that does not “affirmatively” express consent of the drafting
party to subject itself to collective challenges should be read as if it were
straightforwardly carrying the opposite message: class arbitration is
forbidden.148 By merely adding one word to an older precedent, Chief
Justice Roberts set isolation as the new default rule.
Given the zero probability that corporations will ever express an
affirmative consent to class arbitration,149 we have now completed a full
circle: we started from corporations adding arbitration clauses to their
mass contracts in order to hide within them collective action waivers, and
now the mere existence of an arbitration clause—one that does not even
include a waiver—leads to the same result. Requiring “affirmative”
consent to class arbitration, therefore, transforms naked arbitration
clauses and the very idea of arbitration into a direct method of separating
claimants, even without saying a word about it. As a result, anyone who,
like Frank Varela, signed an arbitration clause because he or she had no
other choice is also taken as someone who signed off any right to band
together with others. Note the biased treatment of consent that follows.
While the Court refuses to take into account corporations’ implied
consent (only their “affirmative” consent will count), it is more than eager
to rely on the implied consent of the other party to the contract. Once
people like Frank Varela have signed on the dotted line of an arbitration
clause, the Court assumes that they also have given their implied consent
to waiving their collective rights. In short, implied consent works only to
separate people.
Why did Chief Justice Roberts make such an effort to weave the word
“affirmative” into the original text of Stolt-Nielsen? It is because Lamps
Plus, like other drafters of mass contracts that use arbitration clauses that
do not contain a collective action waiver, would have lost without this
added word. One leading reason is the maxim of contra proferentem, an
interpretation rule that guides judges to hold contractual ambiguities
146. Id. at 1412 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684).
147. Id. at 1416, 1419 (repeating the word “affirmative”).
148. Id.
149. See Horton, supra note 108, at 1346 (suggesting that affirmative consent to class
arbitration does not exist).
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against the drafter of the contract and accordingly to award unclear terms
the meaning suggested by the non-drafting party.150 This rule, known to
any first-year student of contract law, is applied under two cumulative
conditions: that the drafting party chose the ambiguous language and that
this party enjoyed superiority of power that did not allow the other party
to clarify it. Both conditions can be easily satisfied in the relationship
between Lamps Plus, the drafter, and Frank Varela, its warehouse
employee. More generally, they can similarly be met anytime that
corporations are drafting contracts of adhesion to impose arbitration on
their many consumers, workers, suppliers, and others. Accordingly,
under contra proferentem, corporate drafters who did not include a
waiver in their standard arbitration clause should be taken as implicitly
agreeing to class arbitration.
Determined to block class arbitrations, Chief Justice Roberts was
willing to undo centuries of common law to remove the risk of
collectivity that comes from the rule of contra proferentem. Adding one
more extension to the already-expanded FAA, Chief Justice Roberts
therefore opined that the FAA preempts not only state law or federal
legislation that threatens the operation of arbitrations, but also the general
rule of contra proferentem.151 Chief Justice Roberts further reasoned that
applying the traditional common law rule would produce, by way of
interpretation, an implied consent to class arbitration; while, according to
the Court’s latest decision, such consent “is inconsistent with the
FAA.”152
D. Deliberate Separation
To be sure, other scholars have concluded before that a leading effect
of the so-called arbitration revolution amounts to a demise of the ability
of claimants to protect their rights by banding together. Professor David
Horton recently summarized the works that recognized such effect,
writing: “Concepcion and its progeny have sounded ‘the death knell for
consumer and employment class actions.’”153 Nevertheless, the current
analysis seeks to go beyond identifying the practical effect of the
revolution. With the advantage of seeing one more piece of the puzzle—
the 2019 Lamps Plus decision—it reveals that the “death knell” is a
product of a deliberate separation process promoted by organized

150. Another reason arises from the prevalence of collective action waivers throughout the
years relevant to the dispute.
151. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1418.
152. Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011)).
153. Horton, supra note 108, at 1326 (quoting Maureen A. Weston, The Clash: Squaring
Mandatory Arbitration with Administrative Agency and Representative Recourse, 89 S. CAL. L.
REV. 103, 116 (2015)); see id. at 1326 n.17 (citing many other articles).
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corporate interests and perpetuated by the Court in two parallel lines of
cases.
Consider, for example, reading the most recent decisions in Epic and
Lamps Plus together. Combined, they mean that in 2019, almost a decade
after the release of Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, the mere inclusion of
an arbitration clause is enough to fail claimants’ efforts to band together,
with (Epic) or without (Lamps Plus) a waiver. The fact that the duo has
emerged at the employment setting—once a natural domain of solidarity
and collective rights—further highlights the magnitude of the assault on
collectivity. Significantly, in terms of their legal reasoning, these cases
are hard to reconcile. On the one hand, Epic prevents collective actions
through waivers that are served on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and are thus
supported by a very weak consent of employees. On the other hand,
Lamps Plus reaches the same separating result by insisting that when it
comes to employers, only a strong (“affirmative”) consent will do. How
can weak consent justify compelling individual arbitrations but not class
arbitrations? The only way to explain the two cases together, and indeed
the entire revolution, is thus to recognize that the newest decisions reflect
an intentional use of the FAA not to treat arbitration favorably but to
disfavor collective actions.
Before closing the discussion of the arbitration revolution as a
separation process, a note about judicial activism is in place. In deciding
the waiver cases in accordance with corporations’ interests, the Court can
be viewed as merely having a participatory role in the separation process.
However, in deciding the interpretation cases, the Court should be
recognized as leading the process, helping even corporations that failed
to draft their contracts carefully. Because they involve rare interventions
in arbitral decisions and work to prevent arbitrations, the interpretation
cases substantiate, even more than the waiver cases, the general argument
in this Part: that behind the façade of supporting arbitration rests an
activist jurisprudence that aims at separating claimants in the service of
corporate interests.154 The next Part links the increasing hostility to
collectivity and the resulting separation process to the rising dominance
of neoliberalism.
II. JOINING THE NEOLIBERAL PROJECT
While the previous Part described how two lines of cases, seemingly
dedicated to arbitration, converge to create a separation effect, this Part’s
focus is on the role of discourse and ideology. What comes next
154. NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS 228–29 (2017) (pointing out the irony in that
“after years of criticizing ‘judicial activism’ by the Supreme Court for greater equity, Koch
grantees are now making, as one Cato publication puts it, the Case for an Activist Judiciary to
secure economic liberty”).
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establishes that the arbitration revolution is not merely, and perhaps not
even primarily, a legal shift. Rather, the anti-collective approach and the
isolation it imposes are essential features of a greater transformative
change: the rise to dominance of neoliberalism and the creation of a
corporatized political economy. The result is an important
reconceptualization of the arbitration revolution as both a product of
neoliberal rationality and a tool for further constituting neoliberal
hegemony.
A. Law as Discourse
In its embellished reading of the FAA, the Court’s conservative
majority has not only dramatically changed the law regarding the
availability of collective proceedings; it also has developed a new
framework and original uses of terminologies to reason about the shift.
As a result, the arbitration revolution presents a risk that reaches beyond
its practical outcomes and goes deeper and further to intervene in
people’s perception of reality. Exposing this layer requires revisiting the
leading decisions that mark the arbitration revolution to track nuances of
tone and particular linguistic choices. On this discursive front, the late
Justice Scalia was a pioneer and a dominant leader. His rhetorical moves,
chiefly in writing for the majority in Concepcion, have been heavily cited
in later decisions and have utterly transformed the conversation.
In broad strokes, the new discourse used to promote separation draws
on neoliberal ideas and particularly on neoliberalism’s long history of
vilifying solidarities. But, even more importantly, this discourse also
plays an active role in disseminating neoliberal logic with the power and
authority unique to law. This dissemination effect is what makes the anticollective ideas spread by the Court reach far beyond the claimants that
pragmatically lose access to justice. All people contractually involved
with large corporations—and that means all of us—have been exposed in
the last decades to a powerful message that delegitimizes coming together
in response to being wronged. Exposing the roots of such a message, and
how the Supreme Court became one of its messengers, is a key to better
understanding the full influence of the arbitration revolution.
B. Neoliberalism and the Revolution’s Discourse
The attack on collective actions through the expansion of the FAA has
not happened in a vacuum. Rather, the legal war against collectivity has
also targeted class actions that are divorced from arbitration155 and labor
unions.156 Further, and most importantly, the entire battle has
155. See, e.g., Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 868–69 (2016).
156. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Martin H. Malin, After Janus, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1821,
1823 (2019).
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coincided—both chronologically and ideologically—with the rising
dominance of neoliberal ideas in the United States in the last four
decades.157
Although we all know that we live in the midst of the neoliberal age,
the meaning of the term seems to remain “perplexingly elusive.”158
Hence, the following exploration of how neoliberalism has both incited
the arbitration revolution and benefited from it compels an effort to
clarify what neoliberalism is and how it reached its status as the most
dominant political project of our era.159 One necessary step in this
direction is to remove a common confusion that originates in the word
itself.160 Neoliberalism should not be minimized into a new variation of
a liberal economic approach,161 an observation that has several concrete
manifestations that are highly relevant to our discussion. The first is the
political nature of the neoliberal project.162 In the American context,
157. See WENDY BROWN, IN THE RUINS OF NEOLIBERALISM 21 (2019) (discussing “the
neoliberal transformations taking place around the world in the past four decades”); see also Hila
Keren, Valuing Emotions, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829, 864 (2018) (“Intellectually,
neoliberalism may have been founded in Europe by Friedreich Hayek about seventy-five years
ago, but its practical rise in the Anglo-American world is associated more with the 1980s, under
the leadership and policies of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.” (footnote omitted)).
158. Jamie Peck, Preface: Naming Neoliberalism, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
NEOLIBERALISM xxii (Damien Cahill, Melinda Cooper, Martijn Konings & David Primrose eds.,
2018).
159. See Philip Mirowski, Hell Is Truth Seen Too Late, BOUNDARY, Feb. 2019, at 46
(describing the criticism against the use of “neoliberalism” but insisting that “[a]wareness of the
philosophical core of neoliberalism—namely, the epistemic superiority of the market in all
things—is a necessary prerequisite to understanding some of the most crucial developments in
contemporary politics”); see also BROWN, supra note 157, at 17 (“Neoliberalism—the ideas, the
institutions, the policies, the political rationality—has, along with its spawn, financialization,
likely shaped recent world history as profoundly as any other nameable phenomenon in the same
period, even if scholars continue to debate precisely what both are.”).
160. Part of the reason for this confusion is explained by MacLean as follows:
Members of the Mont Pelerin Society initially chose to refer to themselves as
“neoliberals,” to signal the way they were retooling nineteenth-century promarket ideas; it’s the name applied to them today by critics of the policies they
advocated. But the word “neoliberal” confused Americans because Democrats
in the Roosevelt mold now had such a hammerlock on the word “liberal.”
MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 51.
161. S. M. AMADAE, PRISONERS OF REASON: GAME THEORY AND NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY 11–12 (2015) (arguing that “[t]he shift in orientation from liberalism to neoliberalism
is sufficiently stark” to call for a discussion of the differences).
162. See, e.g., Philip Mirowski, The Political Movement That Dared Not Speak Its Own
Name: The Neoliberal Thought Collective Under Erasure 2 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking,
Working Paper No. 23, 2014) (criticizing in a general way those who refuse to recognize
neoliberalism as a political project and defining it as “a thought collective and political movement
combined”), https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP23-Mirowski.pdf [https://perma
.cc/UJ9E-TPN2].
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while both democrats and republicans are liberals in the sense of
believing in the necessity of capitalist economy and free markets,
neoliberalism better correlates with the interests and beliefs of those on
the right-wing of the political map, including libertarians and
conservatives.163 And, as we shall see, this orientation is not fortuitous
but rather a product of a comprehensive and coordinated effort.
It is thus not an accident that the conservative majority of the Court
has executed the revolution. It is also not an accident that the Justices that
authored the revolution’s leading cases have been all affiliated with and
supported by the neoliberal Federalist Society. The Society, which was
established in 1982, just as neoliberalism had started to rise to
prominence in the United States, is the legal arm of what historian Philip
Mirowski has titled “the Neoliberal Thought Collective”164—the
infrastructure through which neoliberals have calculatingly—albeit
stealthily—built up their movement’s “knowledge production and
political action capacities.”165
For example, Justice Scalia, undoubtedly the leader of the revolution,
was probably “the most important elite sponsor of the Society” since its
early days—at the time during which he was a mentor and advisor to the
student founders of the Society as a faculty member at the Chicago
School of Law.166 In 1987, when “the Federalist Society hosted its firstever national lawyers convention at the Mayflower Hotel” in
Washington, D.C., Justice Scalia was the first speaker on a panel
dedicated to “Methods of Statutory Construction.”167 He ended his talk
predicting that “in the future” courts will interpret statutes based more on
“objective analysis” and “less [on] legislative history,”168 foretelling how
in the 2000s he would expand the reading of the FAA while setting aside

left.

163. Peck, supra note 158, at xxvi. This is not to say that neoliberalism did not influence the

164. Id.
165. Philip Mirowsky, Neoliberalism: The Movement that Dare Not Speak its Name,
AMERICAN AFFAIRS (2018), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/02/neoliberalism-movementdare-not-speak-name/ [https://perma.cc/D7AM-V49V].
166. See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 141 (2008)
(describing Justice Scalia’s many contributions including fundraising, speaking at the first
conference, and hosting Society members at his home).
167. Methods of Statutory Construction [Archive Collection]: 1987 National Lawyers
Convention, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 30, 1987, 12:00 PM), https://fedsoc.org/events/methods-ofstatutory-construction-archive-collection [https://perma.cc/G275-XUCG].
168. The Federalist Soc’y, 1987 Annual Lawyers Convention: Methods of Statutory
Construction [Archive Collection], YOUTUBE (May 3, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
time_continue=2465&v=xDcXOAnbSuA&feature=emb_logo [https://perma.cc/XW8W-KWXF]
(beginning at 41:04 for quoted material).
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the Act’s legislative history that clearly limited it to arbitration
agreements between commercial parties of similar bargaining power.169
The revolution’s other spearheads—Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Alito, and Justice Gorsuch—all have strong and continuous ties to the
Federalist Society.170 And, while the Society is not openly and directly
involved in politics, it does promote the dissemination of neoliberal logic
via powerful and profound processes of education, training, and
networking.171 The Society has therefore been an “organization of
extraordinary consequence,” openly aiming to counter the liberal (taken
as left-leaning) control of the legal profession.172 To say that the
arbitration revolution is the brainchild of the stellar ambassadors of the
Federalist Society is thus to recognize that the revolution itself is founded
on neoliberal rationality and as such carries salient political weight.
The second meaningful difference between liberalism and
neoliberalism regards the role of the state and the relationship between
the state and the market. Unlike liberals, neoliberals are not genuinely
interested in the separation of the public state from the private market,
even as they voice calls for a small government or non-interventionist
state. Far from the model of Laissez-faire economics, neoliberalism
requires the state “to actively promote and construct a free market
society.”173 Neoliberalism thus reconfigures the liberal commitment of
the state, profoundly transforming it from the duty to care for all its
members and the common good174 to a narrower but active commitment
to the most dominant market players: large businesses and financial
169. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S 105, 125–28 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing the application of the FAA to workers in accordance with the history of the statute).
170. See, e.g., AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST
SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 3 (2017) (describing Justice Alito in
tuxedo at the thirtieth anniversary of the Society). Further, according to the Federalist Society’s
website, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia were both speakers at the 2007 National Lawyer
Convention of the Society. See Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr.: Chief Justice of the United States,
FEDERALIST SOC’Y, https://fedsoc.org/contributors/john-roberts [https://perma.cc/AM56-WPN3].
Similarly, Justice Scalia was a speaker at the 2008 National Lawyer Convention of the Society.
See 2008 National Lawyers Convention, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Nov. 20, 2008, 8:00 AM),
https://fedsoc.org/events/2008-national-lawyers-convention [https://perma.cc/G56G-4ZNT].
Similarly, Justice Gorsuch is listed as a contributor on the Society’s website, see
https://fedsoc.org/contributors/neil-gorsuch[https://perma.cc/T9JY-FLET].
171. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 170, at 3.
172. TELES, supra note 166, at 135.
173. JULIE A. WILSON, NEOLIBERALISM 37 (2018).
174. See Sean Phelan & Simon Dawes, Liberalism and Neoliberalism, OXFORD RES.
ENCYCLOPEDIA (2018), https://oxfordre.com/communication/view/10.1093/acrefore/978019022
8613.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228613-e-176?rskey=pPx3Zm&result=1 [https://perma.cc/5F
XC-BJXT] (describing how liberal philosophers like John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham
approved state intervention on behalf of the worse-off members of society and how philosopher
John Rawls linked freedom with equality and saw the market as part of society as well as an
appropriate subject of social control).
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elites.175 Generally speaking, this new orientation of the state explains
many legal transformations of the last few decades.176 It also more
concretely clarifies why the arbitration revolution so evidently sacrifices
the interests of ordinary citizens to cater to the needs and interests of the
largest businesses.
A third theme of what differentiates neoliberal ideology from
liberalism is the goal and practice of extending the logic of the market to
all areas of life. Although liberals debate the extent to which public
intervention in private markets is justified, they all seem to agree that
some domains lie outside of the market and should be analyzed and
organized according to noneconomic metrics. Neoliberalism, however,
has deliberately produced a radical restructuring not only of the economy
but also of non-market fields such as “politics, society, culture, and the
environment.”177 It even has restructured our emotions.178 One scholar
described the theoretical shift as a process in which “[m]arket ideas
moved out of economics departments to become the new standard
currency of the social sciences” until they “became fixtures of common
sense.”179
The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, one of the symbols of
neoliberalism, once made a famous declaration of neoliberalism’s
ambitious effort to establish itself as general common sense, stating that
“[e]conomics are the method; [but] the object is to change the . . . soul.”180
Accordingly, the neoliberal project uses many mediums through which it
disseminates its logic until it can penetrate our subjectivities. One path to
the soul is discourse—a set of communicative acts through which, in a
complex social process, ideas get widely circulated, turn into “truths,”
and become the “common sense.”181 And, once an idea becomes part of
common sense, it is ready to be internalized, or, as Thatcher would have
it, to change the soul.
Crucially, as a forceful social institution that exerts authority and is
trusted by many, the law can operate precisely in this way, and the
175. See WILSON, supra note 173, at 27; see also DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF
NEOLIBERALISM 33 (2005) (“In the event of a conflict between Main Street and Wall Street, the
latter was to be favoured.”).
176. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, THE NEW ROBERTS COURT, DONALD TRUMP, AND OUR
FAILING CONSTITUTION 173–86 (2017) (describing some of the pro-business decisions led by the
conservative majority of the Roberts Court).
177. Peck, supra note 158, at xxx.
178. See Keren, supra note 157, at 864 (discussing neoliberalism treating emotions as a new
type of personal property).
179. DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 10 (2011).
180. Interview by Ronald Butt with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, U.K., in London,
U.K. (May 3, 1981).
181. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE & THE DISCOURSE ON
LANGUAGE app. 215 (A. M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1972).
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arbitration revolution offers a prime example. It demonstrates the
takeover of a noneconomic arena by the metrics used initially only in
market settings. Revolution aside, arbitration is one of several methods
of alternative dispute resolution, all operating alongside conventional
litigation. As such, arbitration is part of a civilized justice system
maintained by society to avoid violent settlement of disagreements.
Nonetheless, when the revolution commenced, it reconfigured arbitration
as purely “a matter of contract,”182 thereby concealing its essence as an
institutionalized form of dispute resolution. To further distance
arbitration from justice, the new cases emphasized that arbitrations
should be evaluated by their ability to achieve the core market goal of
economic efficiency. Moreover, as Justice Scalia repeatedly stated in
Concepcion and Italian Colors, such economic efficiency is to be
measured by conventional economic metrics such as “costs,” “savings,”
and “speed.”183 Instead of the “costliness and delays of [public]
litigation,”184 he stated, private arbitration is a “speedy resolution”185 that
offers “greater efficiency” by “reducing the cost and increasing the speed
of dispute resolution.”186 Indeed, by the time the decisions in Epic and
Lamp Plus were written, all that their authors did was adopt Justice
Scalia’s economized language as if it were the only way to discuss
matters of arbitration.
To be sure, some of the economic jargon cited above was used to
discuss arbitrations before. The point is not the use of words with
economic flavor but rather their careful “recycling” to attack collective
actions. Words that were used to compare arbitration to traditional
adjudication are now used differently: to distinguish types of arbitrations
and to convey that while individual arbitrations are valuable, class
arbitrations are harmful. Consider the use of the word “speed” as one
example. Pre-revolution, the Court used the promptness of arbitrations in
a noneconomic way, emphasizing it as a reason to prevent courts from
acting in a manner that would slow down arbitration. The Court stated,
for example, that the FAA reflects a “clear congressional purpose that the
arbitration procedure . . . be speedy and not subject to delay and
obstruction in the courts.”187 Used in this way, “speedy” is not an
economic standard but an idea relating to the harmonization of different
methods of dispute resolution. Post-revolution, however, speed is used to
mark the economic value of individual arbitrations and to portray
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
added).

See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011).
Id. at 345, 350.
Id. at 345 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)).
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 239 (2013).
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 345, 348.
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (emphasis
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collective arbitrations as lacking such value. For example, the Court
cautioned that “with class arbitration ‘the virtues Congress originally saw
in arbitration, its speed and simplicity and inexpensiveness, would be
shorn away.’”188 The new economized discourse thus makes speed a
reason to reject some arbitrations while preferring others, completely
subjecting the domain of dispute resolutions to economic logic.
Similarly, the constant use of the jargon of “incentives” further
transforms the issue of arbitration into a purely economic one. For
example, as an essential part of his legal reasoning, Justice Scalia stressed
in Concepcion that allowing class arbitrations “will have a substantial
deterrent effect on incentives to arbitrate.”189 Later, in Italian Colors, he
similarly translated the justice-based argument that collective action
waivers leave claimants without redress into the language of economics.
Under such treatment, claimants’ insistence on class arbitrations is
explained not by the fact that without them they lose access to justice,190
but merely by the economic problem of having “no economic incentive”
to pursue claims individually.191
In short, a new discourse has been born, subjecting a noneconomic
setting to market rationality. By heavily using an economized rhetoric,
applying a cost-and-benefit analysis, and committing to incentive
thinking, the new arbitration jurisprudence amounts to the production of
what sociologist and philosopher Pierre Bourdieu called a “strong
discourse.”192 Similar to other neoliberal economization processes, the
one transforming the domain of dispute resolution is implemented by
“extending a specific formulation of economic values, practices, and
metrics”193 to a noneconomic issue.
Suppressing any appeal to justice-based arguments completes the
takeover of the field of arbitration by an economized rationality. A salient
part of the arbitration revolution targets any attempt of arbitrators, state
courts, agencies, or the liberal Justices to discuss the issue in
noneconomic terms such as fairness and public policy. The revolution’s
cases offer abundant examples of such negation of any alternative
rationality—as if they follow Margret Thatcher’s “there is no alternative”
188. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019) (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018)).
189. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351 n.8.
190. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in
Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 782 (2002) (describing arbitration as the “denial of
access . . . to the law itself”).
191. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235 (2013).
192. Pierre Bourdieu, Utopia of Endless Exploitation: The Essence of Neoliberalism, LE
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Dec. 1998), http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu [https://perma
.cc/65E6-7VG2] (“Neoliberal discourse is not just one discourse among many. Rather, it is a
‘strong discourse.’”).
193. BROWN, supra note 34, at 30.
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slogan, also called the “TINA-Principle.”194 When the dissent in
Concepcion raised the issue that forbidding class proceedings denies
access to justice, the response dismissed such thinking, claiming that
states cannot require preserving class arbitrations, “even if it is desirable
for unrelated reasons.”195 Similarly, in Italian Colors, the Court declared
that an approach that insisted on the public policy underlying antitrust
laws was “simply irrational.”196 And, in Epic, the majority repeated the
general rejection of justice concerns, stating that in expressing concerns
for workers’ ability to enforce wage-and-hour laws, “the dissent retreats
to policy arguments” that courts are “not free” to make.197 The messages
in all these examples go beyond applying an economic discourse to a
noneconomic topic: together, they confront the legitimacy of arguments
regarding justice, fairness, and public policy—once at the heart of legal
debates regarding alternative dispute resolutions.
The dismissal of any reasoning that deviates from market logic is a
signature move of the neoliberal project. Following cultural critic Henry
Giroux it is dubbed the “disimagination machine”198: the apparatus
neoliberalism uses to gain hegemony and stifle resistance by making all
alternative worldviews unimaginable.199 In the context of the arbitration
debate, the alleged exclusivity of the economized discourse is directly
aimed at the disimagination of the possibility of collectivism. Because
according to economized logic class arbitrations do not make sense, and
because no other analysis of the issue is considered legitimate, the
capacity of individuals to resist corporate wrongdoing by coming
together is “disimagined,” making class arbitration inconceivable. But
there is more. As the following section discusses, neoliberal strategies
have been used not only to differentiate class arbitrations from individual
arbitrations based on economic logic but also to demonize them.
C. The Neoliberal Road to Separation200
The decisions that constitute the revolution include strong rhetoric
against class arbitrations. The assault starts by portraying these
arbitrations as inferior according to market rationality: both “slower” and

Christian Neuhäuser, TINA, KRISIS, no. 2, 2018, at 15.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011) (emphasis added).
Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 234.
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
HENRY A. GIROUX, THE VIOLENCE OF ORGANIZED FORGETTING: THINKING BEYOND
AMERICA’S DISIMAGINATION MACHINE 26–27 (2014).
199. WILSON, supra note 173, at 72.
200. The title of this section alludes to Friedrich Hayek’s famous book, The Road to Serfdom,
originally written in German and considered to be the fundamental text of the neoliberal project.
See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
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“more costly” than individual arbitrations.201 From there, it continues to
presenting doubt regarding the authenticity and integrity of class
arbitrations, describing them as “manufactured,” first in Concepcion202
and most recently in Lamps Plus.203 And it gets harsher. The revolution’s
cases also portray class arbitrations as dangerous. In Italian Colors, the
Court cautioned that if courts were obligated to ensure that a singular
resolution is a viable option as a condition to enforcing a class arbitration
waiver, the result would be a “litigating hurdle,”204 which “would
undoubtedly destroy the prospect of a speedy resolution.”205 Even more
belligerent is the deliberate effort to associate collectivity with the specter
of chaos. Allowing class arbitrations, wrote Justice Scalia in Concepcion
for the first time, is “likely to generate procedural morass.”206 Then,
proving that he intentionally used this strong rhetoric, he repeated the
exact sentence in Italian Colors.207 Next, to further spread the
pronounced disdain towards class arbitration, both Justice Gorsuch in
Epic and Chief Justice Roberts in Lamps Plus repeatedly emphasized the
same threat of morass.208 Together, the cases that regularly identify class
arbitrations with the specter “morass” follow the neoliberal method of
turning anything that contributes to the public good into “a metaphor for
public disorder.”209 One can only hypothesize that Justice Scalia designed
the legal phrase “[p]rocedural morass” to echo the neoliberal attack on
the welfare state, which has been constantly presented as creating a
“bureaucratic morass.”210
Furthermore, revealing much of neoliberalism’s relentless loyalty to
corporations, the revolution’s decisions further demonize class
arbitrations by describing them as intentionally harming the corporations
that are their typical defendants. Class arbitrations are portrayed, for
example, as a tool utilized to bully corporations “into settling
questionable claims,”211 one that “unfairly ‘plac[es] pressure on the

201. E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011); see also Lamps
Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019) (describing class arbitration by quoting
Concepcion); Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1623 (same); Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 238 (same).
202. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348.
203. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417–18 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348).
204. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 238–39 (emphasis added).
205. Id. (emphasis added).
206. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added).
207. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 238 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348).
208. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S.
at 348); Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348).
209. Henry A. Giroux, Neoliberalism, Corporate Culture, and the Promise of Higher
Education: The University as a Democratic Public Sphere, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 425, 428 (2002).
210. DONNCHA MARRON, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 91 (2009).
211. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350.
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defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims,’”212 while exposing them
to “the risk of ‘in terrorem’ settlements.”213 However, given corporations’
significant power advantage, this description of victimhood rings hollow
and can be seen only as part of a robust anti-collective message.
Significantly, this fierce attack on class arbitrations is tightly linked to
and serves as a leading illustration of neoliberalism’s general assault on
anything collective.214 Awareness of this linkage is critical to developing
a deeper understanding of the roots and real purpose of the revolution. To
neoliberals, all acts of solidarity that can challenge the existing structure
of power are unwelcome. Under neoliberalism, individuals should remain
strictly focused on increasing their personal human capital, and thus,
“they are not supposed to choose to construct strong collective
institutions.”215 Indeed, as Bourdieu theorized, in its essence,
neoliberalism is “a programme of the methodological destruction of
collectives.”216
But why do neoliberals so strongly object to individuals’ efforts to
cooperate? One evident reason is neoliberalism’s aspiration to total
hegemony. As part of imposing market rationality everywhere,
neoliberals are highly committed to preserving and enhancing the current
control of the strongest market actors. Accordingly, they are also
committed to blocking any resistance by collectives of ordinary citizens,
such as consumers or employees. From this perspective, a neoliberal
worldview dictates supporting the efforts of corporations to insulate
themselves from demanding legal confrontations that carry significant
economic and reputational risks.
And yet, to more fully understand the resistance to collectivity, one
needs to go deeper and interrogate the intellectual roots of neoliberalism
and the way they have shaped influential neoliberal strategies that can
shed light on the success of the arbitration. In her thorough study of the
archives of one of the leading thinkers of neoliberalism, the late Nobel
Laureate James Buchanan, historian Nancy MacLean recently offered an
original explanation that goes to the theoretical origins of American
neoliberalism. In general, her book, titled Democracy In Chains, details
the centrality of Buchanan’s work to the project of transferring to the
United States the original of neoliberal ideas,217 which emerged in the
famous gathering in Mont Pelerin and were articulated in the writings of
212. Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1632 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., PA v. Allstate Ins.,
559 U.S. 393, 445 n.3 (2010)).
213. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350.
214. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 34, at 153; WILSON, supra note 173, at 5.
215. See HARVEY, supra note 175, at 69.
216. Bourdieu, supra note 192 (emphasis omitted).
217. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at xviii (arguing that the Buchanan’s lifetime work played
a major role in saving neoliberal ideas from remaining a “dead-end fantasy”).
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economist Friedrich Hayek.218 Aptly, Buchanan even referred to himself
as the “American ‘Hayek.’”219
Of particular relevance to the neoliberal assault on collectivity,
MacLean’s study exposes that neoliberal intellectuals often used the
phrase “the collective order” as a cipher for the enemy of their goals.220
The phrase referred to the risky ability of individuals, who are powerless
when separated, to band together and make demands for legal and policy
reforms that government officials would accept due to the strength of
numbers.221 The “collective order” is perilous because to satisfy the needs
of the many would necessarily require the fewer wealthy to participate in
funding the efforts while sacrificing their interests.
Accordingly, in 1956, when the University of Virginia asked him to
chair its economic department and to found and lead the Thomas
Jefferson Center for Political Economy and Social Philosophy, Buchanan
suggested a mission statement that clarified that the new center would
exclude those who seem to support “the coercive powers of the collective
order.”222 He also later explained that the new center would aim to break
“the powerful grip that collectivist ideology already had on the minds of
intellectuals.”223
MacLean’s analysis suggests that what lies at the core of the neoliberal
hostility to collective group action is fear of “the American people
collectively.”224 In a defensive response, therefore, the neoliberal plan has
been for many years to delegitimize and defeat collective acts.
Buchanan’s famous and highly influential public choice theory, for which
he was awarded the Nobel Prize in economic sciences in 1986, offers a
leading example of the intellectual effort to minimize the threat of group
action. One of the theory’s central innovations was a negative exposition
of the very attempt of collectives to pursue their interests, a dynamic that
the theory marked inadequate, not least by giving it a new name with a
flavor of manipulation and greed: “rent seeking.”225 The fact that the
public choice theory was presented and accepted as a groundbreaking
academic work, as opposed to an ideological argument, helped to make
it influential outside of economics departments, with a particular sway on
218. See DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND THE
BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS 2–3 (2012).
219. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 137.
220. Id. at xxiii.
221. See id. at xxii.
222. Id. at 45 (quoting the private mission statement submitted by Buchanan).
223. Id. at 46 (quoting the private mission statement submitted by Buchanan).
224. Id. at 10.
225. See AMADAE, supra note 161, at 270 (explaining rent-seeking); see also Sophie Harnay
& Alain Marciano, Seeking Rents Through Class Actions and Legislative Lobbying: A
Comparison, 32 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 293, 300–02 (2011) (discussing the consequences for rentseeking strategies).
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legal analysis, mainly through the theory’s adoption by the increasingly
dominant law and economics movement.226 The rational choice theory
and the related game theory have similarly helped to shape anti-collective
views in many disciplines. As political scientist S. M. Amadae argues in
her book Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political
Economy, “collective action, public interest, voluntary cooperation,
trades unions, social solidarity, and even voting are all irrational
according to rational choice theory.”227
Importantly, resistance to collectivity has not remained academic.
Theories such as the public choice theory and the rational choice theory
have had an immense impact in the real world, and their message that
collective action is “inefficient” and “manipulative” eventually found its
way to the Supreme Court and helped to bring about the arbitration
revolution. Salient facilitators of the flow of ideas from universities to
courts have been generous funding and massive organization-building
activity by the financial elite that lead America’s largest corporations
with the leading example of the billionaire brothers David and Charles
Koch. Sharing Buchanan’s concerns regarding “the collective order,” but
understanding the limits of their direct political power under a democratic
majority system,228 the Koch brothers have spent decades “funding
conservative economists and law professors, think tanks, and political
groups.”229 In doing so, they seem to have followed Buchanan’s
important strategy that called for paying “attention to the rules rather than
the rulers.”230 In MacLean’s words:
Only James Buchanan had also developed an operational
strategy for how to get to that radically new society, one that
took as axiomatic what both Buchanan and Koch understood
viscerally: that the enduring impediment to the enactment of
their political vision was the ability of the American people,
through the power of their numbers, to reject the program.231
Additionally, and as part of paying attention to the “rules,” the Koch
brothers have also supported the advancement of Buchanan-like ideas
through educating and training future rulemakers—from law students,
through lawyers, to judges—and helping them secure influential
226. See TELES, supra note 166, at 121.
227. AMADAE, supra note 161, at 9–10.
228. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 193.
229. Alex Kotch, US Treasury Cites Koch-Funded Research in Critique of Consumer
Protections, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://www.ibtimes.com/politicalcapital/us-treasury-cites-koch-funded-research-critique-consumer-protections-2607138
[https://perma.cc/7SGQ-2FQL].
230. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 184.
231. Id. at 193.
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positions.232 While this space is too limited to describe the many ways in
which interested economic elites promote neoliberal ideas through law,233
one example that particularly relates to the battle against collective
actions and the arbitration revolution is worth highlighting. It shows that
the hostility to collective actions expressed in the leading cases of the
revolution is part of a concerted and well-planned effort to defeat
collective actions by a combination of theory, money, and law.
The Justices who wrote the revolution’s leading cases—Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Alito, and Justice Gorsuch—had
significant exposure to the aversion towards collectivity, and their
familiarity with the issue was not coincidental but a product of deliberate
efforts. We already have seen that the Justices have long been connected
with the Federalist Society.234 What needs to be added here, to illustrate
the pathways from theory to legal change further, is the issue of funding.
To disseminate Buchanan-like approaches in a manner that can reach the
rulemakers, the Koch brothers have offered direct and significant
financial support to the Federalist Society, sponsoring the Society’s
efforts to organize gatherings in which market-based ideas would be
exchanged and to promote committed participants to the judiciary.235 In
addition, to stretch their worldview to the bench, the Koch brothers also
established their complex network of organizations and centers—
sometimes referred to as “Kochtopus”236 or “Kochland.”237 This network
has offered members of the judiciary, including the abovementioned
Supreme Court Justices, many opportunities to closely interact with
theorists and business moguls in summer training sessions, seminars,
fundraising events, and more.238
For example, in 2007, Justice Scalia took part in a “‘political strategy
and fund-raising’ seminar” organized by the Koch brothers while the
Federalist Society reimbursed all his expenses.239 The ethical aspects of
such participation attracted some criticism,240 but for the current
discussion, what matters more is mapping out how the goal of shielding
corporations from collective challenges might have made its way from
See id. at 195.
See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 34, at 151–73.
See supra Part II.
MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY: HOW
CONSERVATIVES TOOK THE LAW BACK FROM LIBERALS 17 tbl.3 (2013) (listing the Koch family,
via different foundations, amongst the leading contributors to the society).
236. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 189.
237. CHRISTOPHER LEONARD, KOCHLAND: THE SECRET HISTORY OF KOCH INDUSTRIES AND
CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA (2019).
238. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 195 (“[A] stunning 40 percent of the U.S. federal judiciary
had been treated to a Koch-backed curriculum.”).
239. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 426 (2014).
240. See id. at 426–27.
232.
233.
234.
235.
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theory to revolution. On the same point, Buchanan’s involvement with
George Mason University (GMU) in general, and the history of the birth
and rise of GMU’s law school in particular, both offer another
illuminating example that ties together theory (Buchanan), funding
(Koch), and law (Justice Scalia). In the 1980s, after Buchanan joined
GMU’s economics department and brought with him the Center for the
Study of Public Choice,241 his presence came with “[l]iterally millions of
dollars.”242 Subsequent to Buchanan’s move to GMU, Charles Koch had
the Institute for Humane Studies, which he controlled, follow.243 Soon
after, the head of the institute invited Buchanan to speak at the national
conference of the Federalist Society and although it is not clear whether
he accepted the invite, his theories were discussed many times during the
Society’s gatherings, where, as referenced earlier, the Justices leading the
revolution, and especially Justice Scalia, were sometimes in
attendance.244
The Koch family continued to support spreading Buchanan anticollective ideas. In 1997, for example, it donated ten million dollars to
the creation of the new and enlarged James Buchanan Center for Political
Economy, explaining to a forum of research fellows that achieving
reforms while being “greatly outnumbered” by the majority of citizens
requires developing “winning strategies.”245 Similarly, in 2016, the
Charles Koch Foundation added another ten million dollars to support
renaming GMU’s law school, itself an establishment committed to
conservative law and economics thinking.246 With the help of this
donation, the law school that Henry Mann established then changed its
name to the Antonin Scalia Law School.247 In its announcement of the
name-change the school also reported that the Kochs’ contribution was
supplemented by another gift of twenty million dollars from a donor who
had contacted GMU via the executive vice president of the Federalist
Society, Leonard Leo, whom the announcement described as “a personal
241. Mason Remembers Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan, GEO. MASON U. (Jan. 11,
2013), https://www2.gmu.edu/news/1105 [https://perma.cc/BJ4Z-R6XJ].
242. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 172 (quoting then-senior vice president of George Mason
University).
243. See Matthew Baraka, George Mason University Becomes a Favorite of Charles Koch,
AP (Apr. 1, 2016), https://apnews.com/613470e79eb64a5f9a4880996e0fd7c5/george-masonuniversity-becomes-favorite-charles-koch [https://perma.cc/B7WY-H7AP].
244. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
245. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at xx, 242 n.13 (quoting Charles G. Koch, Address to a
Fellows Research Colloquium: Creating a Science of Liberty (1997)).
246. For the history of the law school, and its importance in disseminating conservative
ideology, see TELES, supra note 166, at 207–16.
247. See Mason Receives $30 Million in Gifts, Renames Law School After Justice Antonin
Scalia, GEO. MASON U. (2016), https://www.law.gmu.edu/news/2016/scalia_school_of_law_
announcement [https://perma.cc/KBK7-V6HM].
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friend of the late Justice Scalia and his family.”248 Leonard Leo, others
argued, is also the one who brought to the Supreme Court the other three
Justices that have led the revolution, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito and Gorsuch.249
While all the ties described above may amount only to a
“circumstantial trail [that] leaves many open questions,” to use
MacLean’s candid words,250 the point here is mainly to illustrate the
purposeful investment in diffusing anti-collective theories and a procorporate approach into the legal system, enough to empower the
emergence of a new jurisprudence that would eliminate the ability of
individuals to band together against corporations.
Much more directly, stalwarts of the Koch-supported Federalist
Society openly sought to bring the revolution about via a variety of
amicus briefs. Prior to the historic decision in Concepcion, for example,
members of the Society were involved in filing four different amicus
briefs calling for an unlimited affirmation of collective action waivers:
on behalf of the Class Action Fairness Center, the Wireless Association,
The Voice of the Defense Bar, and by a group of “Distinguished Law
Professors.”251 Indeed, in an analysis of Concepcion published in the
Federalist Society’s journal, titled Class Action Watch, Professor Brian
Fitzpatrick—to whom the Society awarded in the same year its lucrative
Bator award252—opined that “the Supreme Court has just handed the
business community its biggest victory in a very long time.”253
Fitzpatrick additionally predicted that “the decision could lead to the end
of class actions against businesses across most—if not all—of their
activities.”254 And, as subsequent cases of the revolution prove, he was
right. Years of writing, educating, funding, and organizing eventually
succeeded, awarding corporations a weapon against the loathed
“collective order.”
To summarize this detailed section, it is therefore possible to sketch
in broad strokes the path from the development of neoliberal ideas in the
United States to the most recent decision of the arbitration revolution. In
248. Id.
249. Terry Gross, How One Man Brought Justices Roberts, Alito, and Gorsuch to the
Supreme Court, NPR (Apr. 12, 2017, 1:33 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/04/12/523495201/
how-one-man-brought-justices-roberts-alito-and-gorsuch-to-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc
/XR24-YJHH] (interviewing Jeffrey Toobin, a staff writer at The New Yorker).
250. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at 297 n.72.
251. AVERY & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 235, at 93, 94.
252. Brian Fitzpatrick Receives the Federalist Society’s 2011 Bator Award, VAND. U. (Mar.
7, 2011), https://law.vanderbilt.edu/news/brian-fitzpatrick-receives-the-federalist-societys-2011bator-award/ [https://perma.cc/U94S-X24G].
253. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Did the Supreme Court Just Kill the Class Action?, CLASS ACTION
WATCH, Sept. 2011, at 1, 12.
254. Id. at 1.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

41

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 3 [], Art. 3

616

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

the beginning, theories were developed and spread to convey that
collective actions are irrational, coercive, and dangerous. Then,
corporations started to use their market power, as well as market tools
(contracts), to eliminate collective actions. Next, after some years of legal
battles, the law was dramatically changed, compelling courts to enforce
those restrictive contracts, regardless of their impact on access to justice.
And most recently, it was decided that even corporations that did not try
to prevent collective actions explicitly will be helped by the Court that
made sure that from now on, judges and arbitrators will give arbitration
clauses in standard contracts an interpretation that disallows groupaction. Significantly, the leaders of the largest American corporations
have carefully planned and generously funded all of the four stops along
the road to separation. Overall, by actively helping corporations to isolate
people, the majority of the Supreme Court added legal authority to a procorporation and anti-collective neoliberal ideology, further legitimizing
its rationality and amplifying its already immense impact.
As if predicting all that, geographer David Harvey wrote in 2005 that
“the neoliberal state is necessarily hostile to all forms of social solidarity
that put restraints on capital accumulation.”255 He further explained that,
if need be, the state will use its legal arm against collectives, resorting “to
coercive legislation and policing tactics . . . to disperse or repress
collective forms of opposition to corporate power.”256 The more profound
investigation of the theoretical roots of resisting collective actions
combined with the sketching of how those ideas were deliberately
diffused into the Supreme Court perfectly matches Harvey’s description:
the arbitration revolution indeed has operated to “repress collective forms
of opposition to corporate power.” The coming Part asks: Repression at
what price?
III. GENERATING AFFECTIVE POWERLESSNESS
As others have argued before,257 and I have written elsewhere,258 the
arbitration revolution and the increasing ability of corporations to
immunize themselves from liability that it fostered have many negative

255. HARVEY, supra note 175, at 75. Note that here again neoliberalism greatly differs from
liberalism, especially the Rawlsian type of liberalism, which would have supported collective
actions to promote individual interests, particularly when individual autonomy is at risk due to
inequalities. Cf. Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory,
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 753, 764–79 (2007) (discussing the different theories that are relevant to the
class action debate).
256. HARVEY, supra note 175, at 77.
257. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 25, at 3054, 3057.
258. See Hila Keren, Undermining Justice: The Two Rises of Freedom of Contract and the
Fall of Equity, 2 CANADIAN J. COMP. & CONTEMP. L. 339, 345 (2016).
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consequences. Those include a severe decrease in access to justice,259
weakening of both the common law260 and essential federal laws that rely
on private civil litigation,261 and, due to the accumulation of all of the
previous concerns, general harm to equality and the rule of law.262
However, recognizing the role of neoliberalism in shaping the anticollectivist core of the revolution allows identifying additional damage:
a pervasive emotionally corrosive effect that carries with it a long-term
social risk.
To those interested in studying the impact of neoliberalism, these yetto-be-noticed consequences—which arise outside of the conventional
domains of law and economics—will not come as a surprise. After all, as
mentioned earlier, Margaret Thatcher famously announced that the goal
of disseminating neoliberal ideas has always been “to change the soul.”263
Moreover, critics of neoliberalism have long been cautioning that the
neoliberal takeover includes significant and intentional influence on the
emotions and that such control hurts our sociality.264
As argued in the previous Parts, the arbitration revolution has created
a separation process that has been inspired by neoliberal theorists,
executed and funded by organized corporate leaders, and embraced by
the Supreme Court. This Part cautions that this separation process has a
penetrating effect on the soul. It leaves people isolated from their peers
and abandoned by their state. All alone, ordinary citizens are being put
into a long-term condition of feeling powerless and helpless, too
weakened to engage in resistance. The fact that such powerlessness
perfectly aligns with the neoliberal goal of reaching hegemony suggests
that the emotional consequences are far from accidental.
A. Individualized Arbitrations and Neoliberal Individualization
Decades of organized pressure to defeat collective actions, both in
judicial and arbitral forums, have left people like Frank Varela with only
one path of action: to pursue justice outside of courts and all alone.
Intriguingly, while eradicating all other options, the decisions that
constitute the revolution reformed even the name of this surviving option.
In the middle of the revolution, after Stolt-Nielsen, Concepcion, and
259. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012).
260. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 25, at 377 (“For the entire categories of cases that are
ushered into [arbitration] . . . common law doctrinal development will cease.”).
261. See, e.g., David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 989 (2017)
(explaining “how arbitration affects the implementation of statutes that are enforced through
private civil litigation”).
262. See, e.g., Keren, supra note 258, at 395.
263. Interview by Ronald Butt with Margaret Thatcher, supra note 180.
264. See, e.g., Keren, supra note 157, at 871–74 (explaining how the impact of neoliberalism
in the affective arena threatens to fray our social fabric).
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Italian Colors, the Court drifted away from the tradition of calling a nonclass arbitration a “bilateral” arbitration.265 Instead—and for the first time
at the Supreme Court level—Justice Gorsuch introduced in Epic a new
designation, repeatedly referring to a non-class arbitration as an
“individualized” arbitration.266 Shortly after, Chief Justice Roberts
adopted this new labeling in the recent Lamp Plus, as well as other judges
and scholars who wrote about the topic post-Epic.267
Like Shakespeare’s Juliet, one may ask: “[W]hat’s in a name?”268 To
which at least two replies are due, both relying on the broad recognition
of the expressive power of law.269 The first relates to the comparison
between using “bilateral” and “individualized” to describe the only
option left post-revolution. The adjective “bilateral,” which literally
means two-sided,270 also denotes, when used in the context of arbitration,
a dispute resolution process that is mutual, reciprocal, and consensual.271
The use of “bilateral” thus encourages associating the path to redress that
it describes with fundamental principles of justice. At the same time,
“bilateral” also helps to conceal the typical gap of power between the
parties to the standard contracts that forbid collective action, a gap that
so clearly existed in cases like Concepcion and Italian Colors. For those
reasons, using “bilateral” was a convenient linguistic choice for Justice
Scalia, as he introduced for the first time a revolution that closes options
265. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 338, 347–48 (2011) (using
the word “bilateral” six times to refer to non-class arbitration).
266. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619–23, 1626, 1629, 1632 (2018)
(describing this path of arbitration/proceedings/dispute resolution procedure as “individualized”
fifteen times).
267. Until Epic, no decision of the Supreme Court used the term “individualized arbitration.”
The term appeared in lower courts for the first time in 1997. See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin.
Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1424 (M.D. Ala. 1997), rev’d, 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999), and
aff’d, 244 F.3d 814 (2001). Based on a Lexis-Advanced search, from that time and until 5/21/2018
(the date of the Court’s decision in Epic), for more than two decades, the term was used by lower
courts thirty-seven times. Then, in the short time post-Epic and until 8/19/2019 the term was used
in the Court’s decision in Lamp Plus as well as in additional forty-two decisions of lower courts.
This rapidly increasing frequency offers another demonstration of legal dissemination of
neoliberal logic.
268. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2 (arguing that the fact that
Romeo’s last name associates him with a rival family should not matter because “[t]hat which we
call a rose [b]y any other name would smell as sweet”).
269. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 607–
08 (1998); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1650–51 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2022 (1996).
270. Bilateral, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bilateral.
[https://perma.cc/7VA4-CUX8].
271. All synonyms suggested by the web and Microsoft Word versions of thesauri,
respectively. For the online version, see Bilateral, THESAURUS.COM, https://www.thesaurus.com/
browse/bilateral?s=t [https://perma.cc/5S3C-LHSQ].
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formerly open for all. Moreover, and related to the previous Part, such
rhetoric illustrates the stealth “winning strategies” that Buchanan
recommended and Koch institutionalized.272 Conversely, substituting
“bilateral” with “individualized” has none of the above strategic
advantages as the latter word highlights rather than obscures the solitude
that is inherent to the non-collective path to redress.
The second reply relates to the difference between describing the
single remaining way to seek justice as “individualized” and not merely
(as numerous courts have done) as “individual.”273 Interestingly, Justice
Gorsuch added the adjective “individualized” to the discussion in Epic
after the lower court that decided the dispute, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, limited itself to the language of “individual”
arbitration.274 The increasing use of the word “individualized” is a
particularly meaningful rhetorical choice in light of the neoliberal
background of the revolution. It is similarly crucial if one wishes to better
understand how the legal change operates to further disseminate the
neoliberal common sense.
Most generally, breaking social life into individualized segments is a
core idea in neoliberalism. As political scientist Wendy Brown explained,
neoliberalism “solicits the individual as the only relevant and wholly
accountable actor.”275 The goal of neoliberal individualization is not only
to separate people from each other out of the aversion to collectives
mentioned before. It is also to draw a clear dividing line between the self
and its environment, disconnecting people and their experiences from any
social context. In this way, neoliberalism suppresses individuals’ ability
to link their fate to the social order or to implore assistance from social
institutions or the state. It makes, in short, “[s]elf and society . . . mutually
exclusive,”276 echoing Margaret Thatcher’s infamous declaration that
there is no justification for government help because “[t]here is no such
thing as society.”277
It is worth recognizing here that neoliberal individualization is
markedly different from liberal individualism. Individualism emerges
from a celebration of individuality that is associated with agency and
autonomy, and it leaves each person to self-determine her needs and
goals. By contrast, individualization is an imposed process that ignores
272. MACLEAN, supra note 154, at xx.
273. While many lower courts have exclusively used “individual” rather than “bilateral” or
“individualized,” none of the revolution cases have done that. E.g., Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
274. Id.
275. BROWN, supra note 34, at 133.
276. WILSON, supra note 173, at 4.
277. Interview by Douglas Keay with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, U.K., in London,
U.K. (Sept. 23, 1987), https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689 [https://perma.cc
/US6Y-FKCM].
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private inclinations and wishes and generally cares very little about the
individual herself. An important part of the individualization process is
the way neoliberal rationality interrupts autonomy, dictating to all people
that their primary goal, as they approach any area of their life, should be
to maximize their human capital.278 The purpose of such a selfoptimization project is to endlessly attempt to win what neoliberalism
frames as an ongoing competition against other individuals over scarce
resources.279 Individualization also denies the universal vulnerabilities
that make us inevitably interdependent while rendering irrational the
natural yearning for giving and receiving (free) care.280
Accordingly, when Justice Gorsuch repeatedly used the word
“individualized” he revealed that even when they are included in signed
contracts, collective action waivers may not truly be mutual and
consensual (as suggested by “bilateral”) or the product of individual
choice (as indicated by “individual”). Instead, what comes to the fore
thanks to Justice Gorsuch’s new articulation is the forced and involuntary
nature of the process that pressures claimant to battle wrongdoing all by
themselves. Similarly, when Chief Justice Roberts followed Justice
Gorsuch’s discourse in Lamps Plus, he brought to light the fact that even
when arbitration clauses do not include waivers, courts nonetheless are
going to compel claimants to fight alone by reading these clauses as if
they were limiting collective action. To call the resulting narrow path of
access to justice “individualized arbitration” is, therefore, to concede that
“individualization is a fate, not a choice.”281
It is certainly possible that neither Justice Gorsuch nor Chief Justice
Roberts was aware of the critical analyses of the neoliberal “relentless
process of individualization,”282 as they each shifted to using the
language of “individualized” arbitration. They surely did not adopt this
new phrasing with out of a wish to expose the forced nature of the single
path they have left open for claimants. However, at the same time, the
ease with which the word “individualized” entered the conversation
despite its nonconsensual tone can teach us something about how far
along the revolution had already been by the time the decisions in Epic
and Lamps Plus were written. It suggests that by 2018, seven years postConcepcion, and after the election of President Donald Trump resulted in
a conservative control of the Court, the Justices felt confident enough to
forego previous efforts to “market” individual arbitration as something
that, from claimants’ perspective, might be favorable or at least fair.
BROWN, supra note 34, at 31–32, 34.
SAM BINKLEY, HAPPINESS AS ENTERPRISE: AN ESSAY ON NEOLIBERAL LIFE 23 (2014).
WILSON, supra note 173, at 5.
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LIQUID MODERNITY 34 (2000).
Mark Davis & Zygmunt Bauman, FREEDOM AND CONSUMERISM: A CRITIQUE OF
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN LIQUID MODERNITY 93 (2008).
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
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Moreover, in both Epic and Lamps Plus, the Justices not only
described the claimants as subject to an “individualized” process, but they
also adopted another signature move of neoliberalism and
“responsibilized” these claimants, holding them solely and entirely
responsible to their fate.283 First in Epic and then in Lamp Plus, the
individualized employees were further framed as the only ones
responsible for being left without an effective path of redress simply
because they “agreed” to arbitrate. For example, in Epic, Justice Gorsuch
went as far as blaming the individual employee, Mr. Morris, for daring to
sue Ernest and Young “despite having agreed to arbitrate claims against
the firm.”284 In a similar tone, Chief Justice Roberts stated in his
description of the facts in Lamp Plus that “[l]ike most Lamps Plus
employees, Varela had signed an arbitration agreement when he started
work at the company. But after the data breach, he sued Lamps
Plus . . . .”285 It appears that because both Justices had already conceded
that the employees were limited to an “individualized” arbitration they
had no particular need to cope with Justice Ginsburg’s dissent that in both
cases tried to remind everyone that the employees had not truly agreed to
anything but rather had faced a “Hobson’s choice” to “accept arbitration
on their employer’s terms or give up their jobs.”286
And yet, even if the adoption of the “individualized” modifier was not
aimed at illuminating the true nature of non-class arbitration, its
appearance can help seeing that by using the power of the legal system,
neoliberalism individualizes even the ways humans cope with inevitable
crises in their lives, such as the scams that harmed the employees in both
Epic and Lamp Plus. Limited to “individualized” solutions, each person
learns that when in trouble, she cannot count on anyone but herself.
Ironically, the discussion above shows that as part of the neoliberal
project, corporations and the Court have acted together in the last few
decades to create a world defined by intense separation and isolation.
What are the consequences of living in such a world?
B. The Emotional Consequences of Individualization
Importantly, neoliberalism is not only a top-down project led by
corporations and their avid supporters. Much of its success to reach
people of all political persuasions relates to the fact that we have all
internalized the neoliberal logic until it feels our own, sometimes without
283. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 34, at 133 (explaining how people are being
“responsibilized” because neoliberalism, for its own political goals, “solicits the individual as the
only relevant and wholly accountable actor”).
284. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1620 (2018) (emphasis added).
285. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1413 (2019) (emphasis added).
286. Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1636 n.2; Lamp Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1421 (quoting Epic, 138 S. Ct. at
1636 n.2).
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even having full awareness of its origins. This internalization process is
itself a product of a neoliberal strategy. As sociologist Sam Binkley
explains it: “Preferring not to act on subjects directly” and seeking to
“govern minimally” the neoliberal project “brings about specific changes
in its subjects. . . . ”287 To use only one simple example, many think and
say that they need to “invest” more time in themselves, their health, or
their relationship with others, accepting the economic dynamics of
calculating investments and returns without noticing the structural
limitations on their time (such as due to having to work for long hours).288
Some even invest actual money in measuring and ranking their
performance in these noneconomic spheres, using a rapidly growing
marketplace of products designed for such tasks.289 Through such an
internalization process, the neoliberal worldview disseminates itself by
working from within.290
Eventually, coming at us from many external sources and springing
internally, the neoliberal message ends up influencing everything in our
lives, including not only well-calculated big decisions such as what to
study and where, but also, for example, the way we express ourselves. A
particularly relevant example is found in longitudinal studies of written
texts in the United States and Norway that demonstrate how with the rise
of neoliberalism during the last few decades the frequency of words
related to collective solidarity (e.g. “obliged” or “common”) decreased,
while the frequency of words pertaining to individual self-promotion
(e.g., “choose” or “entitlement”) increased.291 Importantly, with this
penetrating power neoliberalism also influences our emotional life.
Accordingly, this section argues that the inability to seek justice
together with others either in courts or in arbitration creates a severe sense
of isolation that produces intense feelings of powerlessness and
helplessness. Such lasting emotions are individually and socially harmful
much beyond the arbitration-controlled contractual arena: they deplete
individual and social resilience in all areas of life and stand to produce
despair and apathy that would further enhance the general social
disconnect produced by neoliberalism.292
287. Sam Binkley, The Emotional Logic of Neoliberalism: Reflexivity and Instrumentality in
Three Theoretical Traditions, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF NEOLIBERALISM, supra note 158, at 589
(emphasis added).
288. See Keren, supra note 157, at 866.
289. See generally id. at 864–71 (describing how neoliberalism has changed the
conceptualization of emotions).
290. Id. at 866.
291. Glenn Adams et al., The Psychology of Neoliberalism and the Neoliberalism of
Psychology, 75 J. SOC. ISSUES 189, 194 (2019).
292. WILSON, supra note 173, at 153 (“[L]iving in [neoliberal] competition breeds social
alienation and disconnection at both the individual and social level.”).
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Illuminating the emotional consequences of ousting collective actions
and leaving people to fend for themselves is an intricate task. Part of the
complexity is that this separation project has culminated, as we have seen,
only recently and in an intentional and stealthy way, which makes
evidence scant. Another complication comes from the general inclination
to ignore the emotions when analyzing legal issues.293 As a result, despite
the richness of scholarly work studying and criticizing the arbitration
revolution, no attention was given to the possibility that it has a long-term
impact on people’s emotions.
And yet, a notable exception recently appeared in the context of
employment contracts when an employee explicitly expressed in a
published interview the emotional impact of being subject to a class
action waiver. The interviewed employee stated: “The employment class
action waiver affected me emotionally as I felt powerless in the
organization. I felt isolated from others . . . .”294 This direct statement
offers a critical starting point, and it indeed begins to substantiate the
considerable emotional toll that the neoliberal attack imposes on
collective actions. A 2017 psychological experiment provides further
direct support, reporting that exposing people to information regarding
the effect of arbitration clauses generated “negative feelings toward
binding arbitration.”295 What follows is a detailed study of less direct
evidence. The findings strongly support the above employee’s account
and particularly demonstrate how denying access to collective legal
actions can produce the powerlessness that the interviewed employee
reported.
1. Reports by Class Action Participants
People who did manage to get involved in class action have reported
an array of positive emotions. Their reports strongly suggest that by
banning class actions, corporations, and the courts that support them,
deprive people of such valuable affective effects. The positive impact of
engagement in class actions can be gleaned from a set of interviews
conducted by Professor Stephen Meili with active representatives of class
actions (often called “named plaintiffs”) and their lawyers. Building on
previous work by Professor Bryant Garth,296 Meili’s interviews
demonstrate a general “sense of empowerment” that comes from the
293. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 1997, 2034 (2010).
294. Matthew B. Seipel, The Strong Do as They Can: How Employment Group-Action
Waivers Alienate Employees, 7 AM. U. LABOR & EMP. L.F. 1, 2 (2017) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting an unnamed Software Engineer).
295. Quintanilla & Avtgis, supra note 32, at 2128.
296. See Bryant G. Garth, Power and Legal Artifice: The Federal Class Action, 26 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 237, 237 (1992).
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involvement in class actions.297 As part of such broad empowerment,
interviewees reported feeling capable, worthy, influential, effective, and
proud. For example, they felt that class actions gave them, despite being
“little people,” the rare ability “to take on large corporate interests.”298
Similarly, they described feeling “satisfied” because they had made a
difference and had been successful in bringing about change.299 As one
plaintiff said, “[T]he point was made . . . the next time around [debt
collectors] will look more in depth at what they’re sending out . . . .”300
Moreover, some interviewees have highlighted the potential of feeling
self-validation by the process. To illustrate, one named plaintiff who
expressed deep disappointment when “his” class action was not certified
explained that certification would have meant that participants “could
have been somebody.”301 Significantly, much of the empowermentrelated emotions were experienced in the face of a threat to resilience.
Interviewees repeatedly contrasted their emerging positive feelings with
being previously disempowered and disrespected by the corporations
they took action against. They described how being part of a class action
activity helped them survive humiliation and restore self-value after
having been made to feel “insignificant”302 or even like “dirt.”303 Such a
description illuminates how collective actions not only offer a practical
solution to limited resources but also offer an essential emotional coping
mechanism.
Similarly, class actions function at the emotional level by offering a
healthy mode of coping with anger and other intense negative emotions
caused by the wrongdoing. For example, for several named plaintiffs the
process allowed them to “air private grievances.”304 Likewise, one
attorney reported that the procedure offered a method for plaintiffs “to do
something” about feeling angry.305 In other words, participants found in
class actions a way to “channel” anger into a much more productive
path.306 Their experiences accord with other scholarly work of law and
emotions theorists that more generally explained the way law could assist
in positively channeling emotions, for example, in the context of
297. Stephen Meili, Collective Justice or Personal Gain? An Empirical Analysis of
Consumer Class Action Lawyers and Named Plaintiffs, 44 AKRON L. REV. 67, 84 (2011).
298. Id. at 90.
299. See id. at 114–18.
300. Id. at 116.
301. Id. at 97 (quoting Telephone Interview 30043 (Sept. 30, 2009)).
302. Id. at 101 (“And they don’t like being told that they’re insignificant . . . .” (quoting
Telephone Interview 30020 (Feb. 3, 2009))).
303. Id. at 93 (“In my opinion, just my opinion, we’re real people here and we’re not worth
dirt.” (quoting Telephone Interview 30039 (Nov. 3, 2009))).
304. Id. at 91.
305. See id. at 107 (quoting Interview 30011 (Oct. 24, 2008)).
306. Id. at 93.
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international tribunals convened in response to episodes of genocide.307
As Professor Martha Minow has argued, such tribunals may turn
consuming grief and rage toward the more concrete and socially
attainable goal of securing justice in relation to specific perpetrators.308
Most relevant to the social aspects of life under forced separation,
many of the named plaintiffs emphasized that what motivated them to
invest their time and energy in the collective process, and what made
them eventually feel empowered by it, was not only and not even mainly
self-interest.309 Because success is far from being guaranteed, and even a
win of a class action frequently means only a modest tangible reward,
participants emphasized first being driven and later feeling rewarded by
something else.310 They described their motivation and satisfaction as
related to being engaged in “protecting the public”311 or representing “the
people who had been harmed.”312 Some even expressed particular care
for class members “who were [more] vulnerable.”313 Confirming the
authenticity of these reported sentiments and explaining their importance,
class action lawyers stated that the best class representatives are those
who “care for something beyond their self-interest.”314 Given such
emphasis on the unselfish drive to collaborate, it is worth noting that
many studies have shown that engaging in other-regarding behaviors and
experiencing other-oriented positive emotions are associated with greater
wellbeing.315 Thus, understanding class actions as expressions of
prosocial motivations explains much of the general sense of
empowerment reported by partakers.
Furthermore, contributors to class actions have also associated their
activity with a sense of moral adequacy. Blending the value of prosocial
behavior and morality, they described, for instance, a feeling that they
“were doing the right thing for hopefully a lot of people.”316 Contributors
also framed their class action as a battle of right and wrong, attributing
their satisfaction to the fact that “‘right’ won out.”317 Needless to say that
307. Abrams & Keren, supra note 293, at 2054 (defining a variety of ways in which law
influences emotions and describing in this context how “[t]he law can also work to channel or
moderate emotions that are already being experienced by a particular person or group”).
308. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 52–90 (1998); Abrams & Keren, supra note 293.
309. See Meili, supra note 297, at 88–89.
310. Id. at 89–96.
311. Id. at 87.
312. Id. at 94 (quoting Telephone Interview 1018 (Dec. 12, 2008)).
313. Id. at 89.
314. Id. at 103 (quoting Telephone Interview 1012 (Nov. 17, 2008)).
315. See, e.g., Stephen G. Post, Altruism, Happiness, and Health: It’s Good to Be Good, 12
INT’L J. BEHAV. MED. 66, 66 (2005).
316. Meili, supra note 297, at 95 (quoting Telephone Interview 30032 (July 28, 2009)).
317. Id. at 117.
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participants’ view of class actions as morally valuable stands in sharp
contrast to their demonized portrayal in the cases constituting the
arbitration revolution. Even more importantly, the reported satisfaction
from doing the right thing reveals that participants in class actions not
only care for other claimants who were similarly harmed but also care
about maintaining just social order.
For all those reasons combined, people who took part in class actions
often stressed that for them, participation meant far more than using a
procedural tool. They have defined class actions as “consumers’ only
recourse”318 and as “the only way” to cope with corporate wrongdoing.319
Indeed, even though emotions were not the focus of Meili’s study, he
found it necessary to emphasize “how many named plaintiffs see the class
action as their last best hope of holding corporations accountable.”320
Accordingly, these reported sentiments suggest that involvement in class
actions was the only thing that saved participants from feeling
helplessness and even despair.
All in all, when they are read with special attention to emotions, the
statements of Meili’s interviewees offer a rare glimpse into the emotional
world of those involved in class actions. Recognizing the positive
emotions coming from such involvement also sheds light on what it
would feel like to live in a world without any collective legal recourse.
Instead of feeling caring, moral, empowered, and proud, people may
remain trapped in their initial anger while feeling disempowered by their
inability to do anything about it. In other words, Meili’s interviewees
reveal emotions that corroborate the feelings of the employee cited
earlier, who—due to being subject to a class action waiver—reported
feeling powerlessness and isolation.321 Most importantly, Meili’s
interviews also help to reconceptualize class action activity as an act of
care and as a form of social activism that aligns with morality and justice.
Such new understanding provides a way to resist the hostile neoliberal
message—often amplified by the Justices responsible for the arbitration
revolution—according to which collective actions are driven by selfish
greed and a desire to a desire to achieve “‘in terrorem’ settlements” of
“questionable claims.”322
Finally, focusing on the emotions that drive collective actions and are
produced by them helps in understanding how natural and robust the
drive to band together is, especially when personal resilience is so
evidently insufficient. A new study by Professors Andrea Chandrasekher
318. Id. (quoting Telephone Interview 1018 (Dec. 12, 2008)).
319. Id. at 118 (quoting Telephone Interview 30034 (Sept. 25, 2009)).
320. Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
321. Cf. Seipel, supra note 294, at 2 (noting how one software engineer felt powerless and
isolated as a result of the employment class action waiver).
322. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss3/3

52

Keren: Divided and Conquered: The Neoliberal Roots and Emotional Consequ

2020]

THE NEOLIBERAL ROOTS AND EMOTIONAL CONSEQUENCES

627

and David Horton further validates this point.323 It reveals that as the
arbitration revolution has progressed and has blocked access to class
arbitrations, claimants yearning for justice have found a new way to band
together, which the authors call “class action-style cases.”324 According
to the study, in this way hundreds of seemingly individual actions that
share identical facts and claims are brought against the same wrongdoer
and are all managed by the same lawyers.325 For example, the study
reports that in one case, the same law firm filed on the same day “1,354
employment cases against Macy’s in the AAA.”326 Although the authors
criticize this new development, their empirical findings tell a story that
matches the testimonies of Meili’s interviewees: that people feel a need
to band together and will make much effort to act in concert against
injustice.
2. Consumers’ Complaints Websites
Both the existence and the content of consumer-created complaint
websites can illustrate how corporate wrongdoing generates a painful
sense of powerlessness that is followed by a rise of need to alleviate the
pain by creating solidarities with others who have similarly suffered. The
websites offer a dense description of the helplessness that comes from
having to face big corporations all alone. First and foremost, such
websites demonstrate a constant quest for coping with wrongdoing
collectively: by communicating with others, exchanging information and
ideas for solutions, and considering and planning engagement in a variety
of collective actions. And, with particular relevance to the current
discussion, a salient place within this effort to band together is saved in
these websites to hopes and attempts to use legal measures and bring
about collective actions.327
Marketing scholars James Ward and Amy Ostrom conducted a study
of forty consumer-constructed websites. The study reported that what
motivates consumers to create complaint websites or engage in their
operation are feelings of isolation and powerlessness as a result of
corporate wrongdoing.328 For example, the study cited one aggrieved
consumer who wrote: “If things go seriously wrong you will be totally on
See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 33, at 26–50.
Id. at 55 (using and describing the term).
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.
For many comments against SLS on Complaints Board, see SLS – Class Action Suit,
COMPLAINTSBOARD, https://www.complaintsboard.com/complaints/sls-c313430.html#comments
[https://perma.cc/VEU7-8EV8], which includes an example of one consumer writing: “How can
we all be a part of this CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT? pLEASE enlighten us.”
328. See James C. Ward & Amy L. Ostrom, Complaining to the Masses: The Role of Protest
Framing in Customer-Created Complaint Web Sites, 33 J. CONSUMER RES. 220, 220 (2006).
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
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your own.”329 More generally, Ward and Ostrom noted that “[c]onsumer
dissatisfaction has long been regarded as primarily a lonely
experience.”330 Importantly, the loneliness that the coauthors described
in their study echoes the feeling of isolation expressed by the employee
cited earlier, who found himself limited by a class action waiver.331
Another interviewee in Ward and Ostrom’s study stated: “us ‘little
people’ seem to have no recourse!!!”332 Note that this last statement is
remarkably identical to the sentiments of Meili’s interviewees, who also
reported resorting to collective action to cope with being made to
experience themselves as “little people” and who also felt that they had
no other recourse.333 This matching choice of words suggests how
characteristic is the link between powerlessness and isolation and how
common it is for people interacting with big corporations to feel
disempowered and as a result to feel a pressing emotionally driven need
to come together. It also explains why when coming together is
forbidden, like in the case of the employee cited earlier, the result is
experiencing similar emotions and referring to them explicitly as
isolation and powerlessness.
Intriguingly, founders of and participants in consumers’ complaints
websites frequently express a strong belief that, pursuant to corporate
aggression, collective action is the exclusive coping mechanism and the
only way to fight the paralyzing effect of powerlessness.334 On this point,
Ward and Ostrom’s study quoted, for example, a disgruntled customer of
Allstate who stated: “If we don’t help each other out, we’re all potential
victims, but there is strength in numbers.”335 Similarly, another frustrated
customer, this time of United Airlines, reportedly asserted: “We must all
work together if we have any chance of making a difference. Let’s get
together and make a stand United!”336 To tie these quotes to the previous
Part, note how they directly clash with Buchanan and Koch’s fear of the
power of numbers and people’s ability to get together.337 More generally,
Ward and Ostrom found that 85% of the site creators encouraged others
to join their efforts by adopting a website design that includes the ability

329. Id. at 224.
330. Id. at 228.
331. Seipel, supra note 294, at 2.
332. Ward & Ostrom, supra note 328, at 226.
333. See Meili, supra note 297, at 90.
334. See Ward & Ostrom, supra note 328, at 221 (“[I]ndividuals may feel impotent to affect
the large institutions that are often targets of protest.”).
335. Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
336. Id. (emphasis added).
337. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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to add and share comments and stories.338 Significantly, 45% of them also
expressly called for acting collectively.339
Most importantly to the discussion of the arbitration revolution,
consumers’ complaint websites reveal that when consumers imagine
joining forces against the business that harmed them, they often envision
using the law and specifically initiating class actions. In one leading site,
tellingly titled the Complaint Board,340 many borrowers have contested
and protested long years of exploitation by a specific lender: Specialized
Loan Services (SLS). For example, expressing both the powerlessness of
confronting SLS all by herself and her desperate desire to unite with
others specifically through a class action, one borrower stated: “I am a
single mother with 3 children. Please let us all get together and make this
into a large if not the largest class action suit ever.”341 Likewise, Ward
and Ostrom’s study described a consumer who was in “tears,” having
realized she is not alone in her battle and asked: “Can we bring a joint
suit against this fraudulent company?”342 Another consumer cited in this
study, named Karla, expressed a similar wish, asking: “Can we get
together? Go to the media, or a class action suit???”343 Meaningfully,
such explicit yearning for class actions coming from consumers’ websites
mirrors and reinforces the positive emotions that the participants of class
actions in Meili’s interviews expressed.
All these voices together—the employee who directly expressed
feelings of powerlessness due to inability to initiate class actions, Meili’s
interviewees who took part in class actions, and the consumers who so
explicitly make online wishes for class actions—present a clear quest for
coming together in response to being harmed. They reflect a reality in
which when individuals feel powerless to cope with wrongs all by
themselves, they tend to handle the situation by searching for an escape
from this paralyzing sense and naturally seek to establish coalitions with
similar others. Then, as an essential part of this prosocial coping
mechanism, people tend to turn to the law, imagining a class action as
one of the most effective ways out of their powerlessness.344 All of that
338. See Ward & Ostrom, supra note 328, at 226.
339. Id.
340. See SLS – Class Action Suit, supra note 327; see also Alex, Best Complaint Websites
2018, MEDIUM (Mar. 7, 2018), https://medium.com/@complaintlinealex/best-complaintwebsites-2018-3f1f23b61cdf [https://perma.cc/4BWJ-7MBZ] (listing and reviewing leading
complaint websites).
341. MR.Hasla, Comment to SLS – Class Action Suit, COMPLAINTSBOARD (Dec. 15, 2012)
(emphasis added), https://www.complaintsboard.com/complaints/sls-c313430.html#comments
[https://perma.cc/VEU7-8EV8].
342. Ward & Ostrom, supra note 328, at 227 (emphasis added).
343. Id. (emphasis added).
344. See Meili, supra note 297, at 131 (“[T]he role of named plaintiff itself provides a sense
of importance and empowerment . . . .”).
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speaks volumes as to the magnitude of the emotional cost of taking away
from those who already feel powerless their primary method of coping:
the collective action option. As we shall now see, the study of emotions
offers additional support to this observation.
3. The Affective Dimensions of Isolation and Powerlessness
While isolation and powerlessness can be treated as cognitive
descriptions of factual conditions, it is crucial to acknowledge their
emotional, sometimes called “affective,” side.345 Scholars interested in
emotions in a variety of disciplines have linked alienation and
powerlessness, describing them as “intra-psychic mental states.”346 They
have also stressed the need to understand powerlessness “in terms of
subjective sentiments.”347 Without diving into nuanced distinctions,
common among theorists of emotions, between emotions, affects,
feelings, and other parallel terms, what is significant for the current
discussion is to notice that a meaningful part of what the interviewees in
all the settings described above had voiced relates to the affective (or
emotional) dimensions of their experiences. “Hearing” their voices as
expressing emotional states is central to improving our understating of
the consequences of the arbitration revolution.
Once the affective side of powerlessness is better recognized, it is vital
to illuminate some of its leading emotional components further to grasp
why feeling powerless can be painful and create the need to overcome the
pain by seeking collective action. In his extensive exploration of affective
powerlessness (which he calls subjective powerlessness), sociologist
Warren TenHouten explains powerlessness as an emotional state that
includes several basic emotions that are each unpleasant on its own.348
For example, his account presents sadness as part of powerlessness and
explains that feeling subjected to external dominance, at the expense of
being able to control one’s reality personally, tends “to increase sadness
and clinical-level depression.”349
Additionally, TenHouten explains that fear is also involved in feeling
powerless, emerging as a response to the realization that actions of a
powerful agent are, or may become, damaging to the wellbeing of the
powerless agent.350 Social hierarchy—such as the one existing between
345. See Warren D. TenHouten, The Emotions of Powerlessness, 9 J. POL. POWER 83, 111
(2016) (“[P]owerlessness is a sentiment that has both cognitive and affective aspects.”).
346. Id. at 84.
347. Melvin Seeman, Sentiments and Structures: Strategies for Research in Alienation, in
96 ALIENATION, COMMUNITY, AND WORK 17, 21 (Andrew Oldenquist & Menachem Rosner eds.,
1991).
348. See TenHouten, supra note 345, at 86.
349. Id. at 86–87.
350. Id. at 87.
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corporations and their consumers and employees—can generate such fear
as soon as the possibility of wrongdoing by the dominant party arises.351
Pertinent to legal disputes, even the prospect of having to confront the
stronger party, especially alone, may induce fear relating to the risks of
both defeat and retaliation.352 For example, in his influential study of
social power, political sociologist John Gaventa described how powerless
coal miners at the Appalachian Valley were afraid to complain and
protest against their working conditions out of fear for their lives, jobs,
and homes.353
What is worse, the fear in powerlessness is often associated with
anxiety due to the lack of perceived ability to cope with the threat.354 Such
anxiety may have additional debilitating consequences.355 Finally,
powerlessness sometimes brings shame about, and even humiliation, both
due to the inability, perceived or actual, to fend off the pressures of those
with power advantage.356 As one scholar observed: “There is no more
humiliating experience than to have one’s relative lack of power in
relation to another continuously rubbed in one’s face,”357 concluding that
“[p]owerlessness activates shame.”358
Appreciating how unpleasant is the affective experience of
powerlessness, especially given the other negative emotions it entails, it
is easier to comprehend how it induces a natural, perhaps even inevitable,
response directed at alleviating the pain.359 And, since the pain is coming
from a sense of diminished control, the spontaneous reaction is an attempt
to restore some power.360 Indeed, a leading theory in social psychology,
“the theory of psychological reactance,” holds in general that “a threat to
or a loss of a freedom motivates the individual to restore that freedom.”361
351. See id. (“Out of prudence, fear, and the desire to curry favor, public performances of
the powerless are often shaped to appeal to the expectations of the powerful, while accepting the
social order’s status quo as natural and inevitable.” (citation omitted)).
352. See id. (“The prospect of challenging dominant elites can result in fear of defeat and
subsequent reprisals.”).
353. JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS 205–06 (1980).
354. See TenHouten, supra note 345, at 92.
355. Id.
356. See id.
357. GERSHEN KAUFMAN, SHAME: THE POWER OF CARING 23 (3d ed. 1992).
358. Id. at 197.
359. See TenHouten, supra note 345, at 94–95 (discussing responses elicited from fear or
embarrassment and the subsequent attempts to minimize those responses).
360. See id. at 87; Derek D. Rucker & Adam D. Galinsky, Desire to Acquire: Powerlessness
and Compensatory Consumption, 35 J. CONSUMER RES., 257, 258–59 (2008).
361. SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF
FREEDOM AND CONTROL 4 (2013); see also Benjamin D. Rosenberg & Jason T. Siegel, A 50-Year
Review of Psychological Reactance Theory: Do Not Read this Article, MOTIVATION SCI., Dec. 21,
2017, at 1 (discussing Brehm’s theory holding that when a person’s freedom of behavior is
threatened, she is “motivated to restore it”).
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In the context of consumption, for example, researchers have argued
based on experiments that “feeling powerless is often an aversive state
that will lead consumers to attempt to attenuate or alter this state.”362
Accordingly, efforts to band together with others to counter wrongdoing
by a stronger entity should be understood as an effort to escape feelings
of powerlessness and restoring some control via collective actions.
However, when restoring control is impossible, as it is in the world
recently created by the arbitration revolution, an opposite psychological
response is likely to emerge. Being trapped in continuous powerlessness
and imposed isolation, people may internalize the external legal rule and
develop learned helplessness.363 According to this influential
psychological theory, when people are exposed to a prolonged (or
permanent) inability to control external events or conditions by taking
action, they become “prone to learn a passive or ‘helpless’ action
orientation.”364 The broader implications of the possibility that the
arbitration revolution is cultivating learned helplessness will be further
discussed in the remaining sections. For now, however, it is valuable to
recognize that at the most individual level, learned helplessness is known
to be associated with many physical and mental health problems such as
chronic stress and depression.365 This is not to suggest that every
uncompensated small-dollars claim can lead, by itself, to these severe
outcomes, but to call attention to the aggregate risk society takes when it
exposes millions of people to arbitration clauses and thus to a systemic
lack of redress.
4. Intentionally Produced Resignation
The affective outcomes of depriving people of their legal ability to
take part in acts of solidarity are hardly unintended consequences. The
neoliberal project, in general, and large corporations, in particular, are
highly interested in maintaining their dominance.366 In the service of this
interest, they engage not only in influencing rules such as the FAA. They
also deliberately and strategically target emotions, imposing isolation in
an effort to deplete people’s emotional resources and, in that way,
362. Rucker & Galinsky, supra note 360, at 257.
363. For one of the most influential works in psychology and in general and the definitive
book on the subject of learned helplessness in particular, see MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN,
HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH (1975).
364. Jarkko Pyysiäinen et al., Neoliberal Governance and ‘Responsibilization’ of Agents:
Reassessing the Mechanisms of Responsibility-Shift in Neoliberal Discursive Environments, 18
DISTINKTION 215, 222 (2017).
365. See, e.g., ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, WHY ZEBRAS DON’T GET ULCERS: THE ACCLAIMED
GUIDE TO STRESS, STRESS-RELATED DISEASES, AND COPING 494–95 (3d ed. 2004) (offering a
review of learned helplessness literature in the context of stress and depression).
366. See WILSON, supra note 173, at 22.
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undermine their resilience.367 The resulting feelings of powerlessness
help neoliberals and corporations to maintain the status quo because they
operate to repress resistance and secure a docile state of mind.368
In their article Capitalism and the Politics of Resignation,
anthropologists Peter Benson and Stuart Kirsch argue that “corporations
actively cultivate” and benefit from a “general feeling of
disempowerment.”369 Naming this feeling “resignation,” the authors
explain it, along the lines of affective powerlessness, as a feeling structure
that reflects a recognition that “things [have] gone awry[,] but one is
practically unable to do anything about it.”370 They further argue that
resignation arises from an “acknowledgment that structural limitations
impede one’s ability to bring about change.”371 In many cases of felt
resignation, they assert, all that is left is to use the popular response of
“whatever,” which conveys the general surrendering to corporations’
unlimited power.372
To illustrate their argument that corporations deliberately “seek to
produce resignation and stifle critique,”373 Benson and Kirsch analyze
strategies that tobacco companies use against consumers’ class actions
and legislative intentions to prohibit smoking.374 They also describe
similar practices used to achieve what they call “the hijacking of
critique”375 in the mining industry.376 Further supporting Benson and
Kirsch’s descriptions of how the politics of resignation works, others
have more recently revealed a similar pattern of intentional cultivation of
powerlessness and resignation in additional corporate settings, such as in
367. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Legal Hopes: Enhancing Resilience Through the
External Cultivation of Positive Emotions, 64 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 111, 113–14 (2013).
368. See Rucker & Galinsky, supra note 360, at 259. Interestingly, corporations benefit from
powerlessness in a way that is even more straightforward than those discussed in this section. The
literature regarding consumers’ behavior establishes that when consumers feel powerless they
tend to spend more money on the purchase of goods and services, especially those associated with
higher status (and more power) or those expected to increase their sense of belonging. See id.;
Lukasz Walasek et al., The Need to Belong and the Value of Belongings: Does Ostracism Change
the Subjective Value of Personal Possessions?, 58 J. BEHAV. & EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 195, 203–
04 (2015) (finding that feelings of ostracism do not impact people’s feelings towards their
belongings except consumers will purchase “an unappealing product only when its public
consumption would increase the opportunity for social affiliation”). These findings align with the
theory of psychological reactance discussed earlier. See Rucker & Galinsky, supra note 360, at
259.
369. Peter Benson & Stuart Kirsch, Capitalism and the Politics of Resignation, 51 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 459, 460 (2010).
370. Id. at 468.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. See id. at 468–71.
375. Id. at 475.
376. See id. at 471–74.
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the rapidly growing industry of data-gathering.377 Together, such works
generally demonstrate that corporations have routinized ways to make
people feel that resistance would be futile with the intention of fostering
resignation.
But why would neoliberals and corporations target the emotions? In
general, because it is an effective way to have people internalize a
message that would have been resisted if ordered from above. Indeed, in
many non-legal disciplines, the so-called “affective turn” has increased
awareness of the role emotions play in guiding human behavior. Such a
body of work teaches that one salient way in which emotions are
understood to direct behavior is their capacity to create action
tendencies.378 Anger, for example, induces an inclination to attack379 and
is considered an emotion that motivates collective action.380 To a large
degree, then, corporations and those who are interested in maintaining
their control must counter such anger at the emotional level. Importantly,
feelings of powerlessness, especially when combined with fear, sadness,
and/or shame, all generate precisely the behaviors that serve best the goal
of securing hegemony: inhibiting defiance and fostering acceptance of
the status quo.
First, with regard to the inhibition of defiance, the cultivation of
affective powerlessness creates action tendencies of avoidance and
inaction381 as well as “passivity and resignation.”382 In the same vein,
studies of affective powerlessness suggest that it is associated with
377. See, e.g., Nora A. Draper & John Turow, The Corporate Cultivation of Digital
Resignation, 21 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1824, 1829 (2019); see also Lina Dencik & Jonathan Cable,
The Advent of Surveillance Realism: Public Opinion and Activist Responses to the Snowden
Leaks, 11 INT’L J. COMM. 763, 777 & n.3 (2017) (discussing how unease over surveillance does
not result in active resistance against such practices).
378. See, e.g., Barbara L. Fredrickson, The Role of Positive Emotions in Positive Psychology:
The Broaden-and-Build Theory of Positive Emotions, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 218, 219 (2001)
(“Discrete emotion theorists often link the function of specific emotions to the concept of specific
action tendencies. Fear, for example, is linked with the urge to escape, anger with the urge to
attack, disgust with the urge to expel, and so on.” (citations omitted)).
379. See id.
380. Martijn van Zomeren et al., Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective
Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-Psychological Perspectives, 134
PSYCHOL. BULL. 504, 506 (2008).
381. See generally RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION & ADAPTATION (1991) (explaining what
action tendencies are and describing avoidance and inaction tendencies as arising from emotions
such as sadness and shame, which are part of affective powerfulness). An example of such
inaction can be seen in the context of climate change. See Christopher Aitken et al., Climate
Change, Powerlessness and the Commons Dilemma: Assessing New Zealanders’ Preparedness
to Act, 21 GLOBAL ENVT’L CHANGE 752, 758 (2011) (suggesting, in the context of climate change,
that individuals who feel more “powerless” are less likely to take action).
382. AARON BEN-ZE’EV, THE SUBTLETY OF EMOTIONS 466 (2000) (discussing sadness, which
is part of affective powerless, as creating passivity and resignation); see also LAZARUS, supra note
381, at 247 (discussing sadness as inducing resignation).
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conforming to authority and submissiveness.383 Over time, all the
tendencies that feeling powerless produce may even turn into the
condition of learned helplessness that was discussed earlier. When this
occurs, the inhibition of defiance becomes more permanent, in line with
the interests of neoliberals and corporations.
Second, with regard to the acceptance of the status quo, it should be
noted that while fostering affective powerlessness produces formal
consent, it is a distorted type of approval.384 Far from expressing an
agreement agreeing to desired results, this consent is based on reluctant
acceptance and has more to do with surrendering to a given reality due to
lack of choice or alternatives.385 Some scholars have called this type of
unwilling consent “acquiescence,”386 and others named it “disaffected
consent.”387 This is also precisely the sort of consent that consumers and
workers are giving—at the beginning of the process—to class action
waivers. Hence, in her dissent in Epic, Justice Ginsburg aptly named them
“arm-twisted waivers.”388 The arbitration revolution thus can and should
be seen as operating at the emotional level to finish off what corporations
have started: cultivating affective powerlessness that not only suppresses
resistance but is also capable of producing “disaffected consent” to the
entire process.
To conclude, an emotional state of powerlessness is not only a severe
consequence of the arbitration revolution but also an intentional outcome
that has been strategically produced to serve the interests of neoliberals
and corporations. Inciting people to feel powerless benefits the hypercapitalist system that neoliberalism promotes and enriches corporations
because, as argued here, it can produce resignation or even learned
helplessness. As a result of such manipulation of the emotions, the urge
to band together and act collectively—so loudly articulated in the
interviews cited earlier—has been dying from within.
CONCLUSION
At the core of this Article are neoliberal processes difficult to notice,
trace, and narrate. And yet, the task is vital. The neoliberalization of
383. See TenHouten, supra note 345, at 93 (noting an association with submissiveness); id.
at 96 (noting an association with conforming to authority).
384. See id. at 93.
385. For different types of consent in general, including “unwanted consent,” see Robin
West, Sex, Law, and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 221, 246–47
(Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010). For different types of consent in the
contractual setting, see Hila Keren, Consenting Under Stress, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 721–23
(2013).
386. TenHouten, supra note 345, at 88.
387. Jeremy Gilbert, Disaffected Consent: That Post-Democratic Feeling, SOUNDINGS,
Summer 2015, at 29.
388. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1642 n.9 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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everything, including our laws, extracts a toll too high to overlook. Such
toll demands that we delve into the intricacies of nonlegal disciplines and
wrestle with their integration so that we can fully account for what is at
stake.
By adding to previous discussions an analysis of the latest episode of
the arbitration revolution, the Supreme Court decision in Lamps Plus, this
Article has made it more evident that the legal system has been going
through a “tectonic shift.”389 It has exposed that as a result of this
decision, corporations do not even need to insist on collective action
waivers anymore. Post-Lamps Plus, corporations need only include
simple arbitration clauses in their standard contracts—the courts will do
the rest. That is, corporations now have the ability to separate millions of
future claimants even without drafting waivers of collective action into
their contracts. The upshot of forging such an easy path to liability
evasion has never been more palpable: without the ability to band
together, most claims are doomed to disappear. This is precisely the
reason corporations sought to include “arbitration” clauses in standard
contracts to begin with: to sound the death knell for most claims against
them.
In her recent book, The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth
and Inequality, Professor Katharina Pistor identifies the wealthenhancing impact of the law.390 She describes how lawyers who “seek to
ensure that their clients can accomplish their goals legally,” use their
planning and drafting skills to shape transactions that “push the
boundaries of existing law,” and then await the response of judges and
regulators.391 Pistor explains that such legal strategies do not always
succeed (recall the invalidation of class action waivers in the “Discover
Bank Rule”392), but insists that through “constantly contesting the
existing boundaries of legal rules . . . lawyers turn any of their clients’
assets into capital.”393 As retold here, the story of using arbitration clauses
as devices that buy corporations’ immunity by the strategy of divide and
conquer provides a powerful example. It details how lawyers and the law
have meaningfully contributed to the creation of new capital for
corporations, allowing them to extract value from their contractual
counterparts while minimizing their exposure to liability.
Moreover, this Article has shown that the arbitration revolution is not
merely, and perhaps not even primarily, a legal shift. Instead, the
389. Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 33, at 4.
390. See generally KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES
WEALTH AND INEQUALITY (2019) (explaining the idea that law creates wealth and inequality
through capital).
391. Id. at 213 (emphasis in the original).
392. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
393. PISTOR, supra note 390, at 213.
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revolution and its sweeping consequences can be fully understood only
once put in their broader context. Taking into account parallel changes in
ideology, politics, and culture, this Article has illuminated the arbitration
revolution as an essential part of a more extensive neoliberal program. It
has demonstrated that as both a product of neoliberal logic and a tool for
further establishment of neoliberal hegemony, the resulting new
arbitration jurisprudence should be reconceptualized as a building block
in the intentional construction of a corporatized political economy. As
such, the revolution belongs with a growing list of legal shifts similarly
operating to allow corporations not only to immunize themselves from
legal liability through contracts, but also to dominate campaign
finance,394 have First Amendment rights,395 break unions,396 and so much
more.
Foreclosing all paths to solidarity does much more than extinguish
any realistic way to cope with corporate power. With immeasurable
authority and immense influence on public opinion, the Supreme Court
has engaged in normalizing, legitimizing, and encouraging the ability of
corporations to become invincible. As a result, and precisely as Margaret
Thatcher wanted it to be, the process has been changing our souls,397
extending the harsh practical effects of the revolution “into the depths of
our subjectivities.”398 As this Article has explained for the first time, the
prolonged factual state of “divided and conquered” induces affective
powerlessness: a dangerous cluster of emotions that leaves people
resigned and unable to resist. Even worse, such affective powerlessness
is not an unintended consequence, but rather part and parcel of “the
‘politics of resignation’”399—a calculated effort by neoliberals and the
corporations they promote to protect their dominance. The principal risk,
thus, does not arise merely from the fact that corporations found a way—
that the Supreme Court approved—to avoid liability. The threat goes far
beyond that to the production of collective numbness and the possible
creation of learned helplessness in our society. Alarmingly, it does not
stop there.
In her recently published book, In the Ruins of Neoliberalism, political
scientist Wendy Brown cautions against the fatal harm to democracy that
the neoliberal takeover of our lives continues to cause. She argues that
while at the beginning the neoliberal project focused on replacing
political control with market control, it more recently (and in a timeline

394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682, 690–91 (2014).
Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018).
Interview by Ronald Butt with Margaret Thatcher, supra note 180.
WILSON, supra note 173, at 46.
Benson & Kirsch, supra note 369, at 460.
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that parallels the arbitration revolution) has gone even further.400
According to Brown, “the neoliberal utopia” of a social order “in which
individuals and families would be politically pacified by markets and
morals”401 has developed into a program of “starving . . . democratic
energies.”402 Her chilling analysis describes relentless neoliberal efforts
“to dedemocratize the political culture and the subjects within it.”403
The arbitration revolution, as reconceptualized in this Article,
forcefully demonstrates the magnitude of the risk Brown identifies. We
cannot assume that the effects of the revolution’s widespread cultivation
of affective powerlessness will remain contained in the realm of standard
contracts. Instead, it is predictable that people who feel resigned because
there is nothing left for them to do when their service providers and
employers wrong them are unlikely to feel motivated to engage in any
other form of democratic citizenship. This specter should motivate
anyone who cares about democracy to not abandon the efforts to change
the current situation. This Article has offered an original understanding
of how the arbitration revolution threatens democracy. Such
understanding should reignite efforts to reverse the revolution and give
people back their freedom to act collectively. Hopefully, a resumed
ability to band together would restore access to justice and, with it, would
generate a broader drive to become more involved in our democratic
society.
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